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Abstract
We address the problem of reasoning about preferences among properties (outcomes, desiderata,
etc.) in Reiter’s default logic. Preferences are expressed using an ordered default theory, consisting
of default rules, world knowledge, and an ordering, reflecting preference, on the default rules. In
contrast with previous work in the area, we do not rely on prioritised versions of default logic,
but rather we transform an ordered default theory into a second, standard default theory wherein
the preferences are respected, in that defaults are applied in the prescribed order. This translation
is accomplished via the naming of defaults, so that reference may be made to a default rule from
within a theory. In an elaboration of the approach, we allow an ordered default theory where
preference information is specified within a default theory. Here one may specify preferences that
hold by default, in a particular context, or give preferences among preferences. In the approach,
one essentially axiomatises how different orderings interact within a theory and need not rely on
metatheoretic characterisations. As well, we can immediately use existing default logic theorem
provers for an implementation. From a theoretical point of view, this shows that the explicit
representation of priorities among defaults adds nothing to the overall expressibility of default logic.
Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The notion of preference or priority in commonsense reasoning is pervasive. For
example, in scheduling not all deadlines may be simultaneously satisfiable, and in
configuration various goals may not be simultaneously met. Preferences among deadlines
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and goals may allow for an acceptable, non-optimal, solution. In decision making,
preferences clearly play a major role. In buying a car for example, one may have various
criteria in mind (inexpensive, safe, fast, etc.); given such desiderata, preferences allow us
to come to an appropriate compromise solution.
It is not difficult to envisage situations going beyond such simple preferences. Thus,
there may be preferences among preferences. For example, in legal reasoning, laws may
apply by default but the laws themselves may conflict. For instance, newer laws will usually
have priority over less recent ones, and laws of a higher authority have priority over laws
of a lower authority. In case of conflict, the “authority” preference takes priority over the
“recency” preference. This also illustrates that one may have several preference orderings,
where the orderings are by different criteria (recency, authority, specificity, etc.) and where
one will need to adjudicate among these preferences to come up with a “global” preferred
outcome.
We have two goals in this paper. First, we present a general framework based on
default logic [32] in which preferences may be expressed. Given that there has been a
wide variety of approaches proposed for dealing with preference (Sections 3 and 7), this
framework provides a uniform setting in which preference orderings can be expressed and
compared. Second, we present a number of approaches to preference in this framework.
In considering how preference orderings may be encoded in default logic, we address
first the case where a default theory consists of world knowledge and a set of default
rules together with (external) preference information between default rules. We show how
such a default theory can be translated into a second theory where preference information
is now incorporated in the theory. With this translation we obtain a theory in standard
default logic, rather than requiring machinery external to default logic, as is found in
previous approaches. We next generalise this approach so that preferences may appear
arbitrarily as part of a default theory and, specifically, preferences among default rules
may (via the naming of default rules) themselves be part of a default rule. This allows
the specification of preferences among preferences, preferences holding in a particular
context, or preferences holding by default. This allows one to axiomatise within a theory
how different preferences orderings interact. As well we consider elaborations to these
approaches. In these approaches, we formalise a prescriptive notion of preference, wherein
the ordering specifies the order in which default rules are to be applied. This is in contrast
to a descriptive notion of preference, where the order reflects the “desirability” that a rule
be applied.
Previous approaches have generally added machinery to an extant approach to
nonmonotonic reasoning. In contrast, we remain within the framework of standard default
logic, rather than building a scheme on top of default logic. This has several advantages.
Foremost, the approach is flexible. As stated above, we can axiomatise how a preference
order interacts with other knowledge, including other default information and preference
orders. Thus we can integrate different orderings in the same setting, with arbitrary
relationships (or meta-orderings) among them. Second, it is easier to compare differing
approaches to handling such orderings. Third, by “compiling” preferences into default
logic, and in using the standard machinery of default logic, we obtain insight into the notion
of preference orderings. So, for instance, if someone doesn’t like our notion of preference
given here, they are free to axiomatise their own within this framework. Also, for example,
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we implicitly show that explicit priorities provide no real increase in the expressibility of
default logic. This final point is particularly important given that nonmonotonic reasoning
systems are now beginning to find application in practical reasoning systems; hence
explicitly dealing with preferences may be seen as a step in developing knowledge
engineering methods for applying default reasoning technologies in reasoning systems.
Lastly, there exist theorem provers for default logic. Consequently our approach can be
immediately incorporated in such a prover. To this end, our approach has been implemented
under the syntactic restriction of extended logic programming; this implementation serves
as a front-end to the logic programming systems dlv and smodels.
2. Default logic and ordered default logic
Default logic [32] augments classical logic by default rules of the form α :β1,...,βn
γ
. For
the most part we deal with singular defaults for which n = 1. Marek and Truszczyn´ski
in [25] show that any default rule can be transformed into a set of defaults with n= 1 and
n= 0; hence our one use of a non-singular rule in Section 5 is for notational convenience
only. A singular rule is normal if β is equivalent to γ ; it is semi-normal if β implies γ .
We sometimes denote the prerequisite α of a default δ by Prereq(δ), its justification β
by Justif (δ), and its consequent γ by Conseq(δ). Accordingly, Prereq(D) is the set of
prerequisites of all default rules in D; Justif (D) and Conseq(D) are defined analogously.
Empty components, such as no prerequisite or even no justifications, are assumed to be
tautological. Defaults with unbound variables are taken to stand for all corresponding
instances. A set of default rules D and a set of formulas W form a default theory (D,W)
that may induce a single or multiple extensions in the following way.
Definition 2.1. Let (D,W) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas. Define
E0 =W and for i > 0:
GDi =
{
α : β1, . . . , βn
γ
∈D | α ∈Ei,¬β1 /∈E, . . . ,¬βn /∈E
}
,
Ei+1 = Th(Ei)∪ {Conseq(δ) | δ ∈GDi}.
Then E is an extension for (D,W) if E =⋃∞i=0Ei .
Any such extension represents a possible set of beliefs about the world at hand. The
above procedure is not constructive since E appears in the specification ofGDi . We define
GD(D,E)=⋃∞i=0GDi as the set of default rules generating extensionE. An enumeration〈δi〉i∈I of default rules is grounded in a set of formulas W , if we have for every i ∈ I that
W ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) ` Prereq(δi).
For adding preferences among default rules, a default theory is usually extended with
an ordering on the set of default rules. In analogy to [1,7], an ordered default theory
(D,W,<) is a finite set D of default rules, a finite set W of formulas, and a strict partial
order < ⊆ D×D on the default rules. That is, < is a binary irreflexive and transitive
relation on D. For simplicity in the following development we assume the existence of a
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default δ> = >:>> ∈D where for every rule δ ∈D, we have δ < δ> if δ 6= δ>. This gives
us a (trivial) maximally preferred default that is always applicable.
3. What’s a default preference?
This section discusses preference orderings in general. While we employ default logic,
the discussion is independent of any particular approach to nonmonotonic reasoning.
Assume that we have an ordered default theory. We can write α1 :β1
γ1
<
α2 :β2
γ2
to express
a preference between two defaults. Informally, the intent is that a higher-ranked default
should be applied or considered before a lower-ranked default.
The notion of preference among defaults, broadly construed, is very general, in that
there are few restrictions that one would place on default rules in a preference ordering.
Consider for example, the defaults “Canadians speak English”, “Québécois speak French”,
“residents of the north of Québec speak Cree”. A preference ordering can be expressed as
follows:
Can : English
English
<
Que : French
French
<
NQue : Cree
Cree
. (1)
So if a resident of the north of Québec didn’t speak Cree, it would be reasonable to assume
that that person spoke French, and if they didn’t speak French, then English. Here we have
a relation of specificity (or subsumption) among the default rule prerequisites. Consider
though a variation on (1) where in the north of Québec the first language is French, then
English, then Cree: The resulting preference ordering is as follows.
NQue : Cree
Cree
<
Can : English
English
<
Que : French
French
. (2)
So here there is no specificity order implied by < among rules prerequisites. Indeed for
preferences, one need not have any antecedent information. That one prefers something
(say, a car) that is red, then green might be expressed as :GreenGreen < :RedRed . In the most general
case, we might have two defaults, with no relation between them except for a given a priori
preference relation.
Preferences may also apply to other preferences. The legal reasoning example given in
the introduction would be such an instance. Finally one may have different preferences
in different contexts, and as well as preferences by default. So, all in all, one may
encounter quite a variety of different preferences in the reasoning process. We address
these possibilities here using default logic. The novel feature of our approach is that
preferences are dealt with within the extant framework of default logic. We do this
by introducing machinery whereby the application of default rules may be very tightly
controlled. Given this machinery, we show how a given preference ordering may be
“compiled” into a “standard” default theory in which defaults are applied according to this
ordering. Consequently one has the freedom and flexibility to axiomatise within a theory
how different orderings interact, when they apply, etc.
We have argued elsewhere [12] that the notion of inheritance of properties is distinct
from that of preference. For default property inheritance, the ordering on defaults
reflects a relation of specificity among the default rule prerequisites. Informally, for
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adjudicating among conflicting defaults, one determines the most specific (with respect
to rule antecedents) defaults as candidates for application. Consider for example defaults
concerning primary means of locomotion: “animals normally walk”, “birds normally fly”,
“penguins normally swim”:
Animal : Walk
Walk
<
Bird : Fly
Fly
<
Penguin : Swim
Swim
. (3)
If we learn that some thing is a penguin (and so a bird and animal), then we would
want to apply the highest-ranked default, if possible, and only the highest-ranked default.
Significantly, if the penguins-swim default is blocked (say the penguin in question has a
fear of water) we don’t try to apply the next default to see if it might fly. Our interests
in this paper lie solely with preference; see [12] for an encoding of inheritance of
properties.
Of approaches dealing with inheritance of properties, in [18,29,34] (among many
others) specificity is determined implicitly, emerging as a property of an underlying
formal system. Reiter and Criscuolo [31], Etherington and Reiter [17] and Delgrande and
Schaub [11] have addressed adding specificity information in default logic. Boutilier [3],
Brewka [7] and Baader and Hollunder [1] consider adding preferences in default logic
while McCarthy [26], Lifschitz [24] and Grosof [22] and Brewka [9], Zhang and Foo [35]
and Brewka and Eiter [4] do the same in circumscription and logic programming,
respectively. 2 We return to these approaches in Section 7, once we have presented and
developed our framework.
3.1. Prescriptive and descriptive preference
There are (at least) two ways that a preference order may be interpreted. For a
prescriptive interpretation, the idea is that an order on defaults specifies the order in which
the defaults are to be applied. Thus one applies (if possible) the most preferred default(s),
the next most preferred, and so on. This approach then has a somewhat “algorithmic” feel
to it. In a descriptive interpretation, the preference order represents a ranking on desired
outcomes: the desirable (or: preferred) situation is one where the most preferred default(s)
are applied. 3 The distinction between these interpretations is illustrated in the following
example [5]:
: A
A
<
: ¬B
¬B <
A : B
B
. (4)
Assume that there is no initial world knowledge. In a prescriptive interpretation, one would
fail to apply the most preferred default (viz. A :BB ) since the antecedent isn’t provable.
However, one might expect to apply the two lesser-preferred defaults, giving an extension
containing {A,¬B}. 4 In a descriptive interpretation one might observe that by applying the
2 Although these latter papers include examples best interpreted as dealing with property inheritance, arguably
they in fact implement the (distinct) notion of preference, described following.
3 This isn’t intended as a cut-and-dried distinction, but rather as an often useful classification. For example, [5]
contains elements of both.
4 This is for instance obtained in [1,7,25]; the approach presented in Section 4 yields no “preferred” extension.
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least-preferred default, the most preferred default can be applied; this yields an extension
containing {A,B}. This has led some researchers to advocate systems based on the
descriptive interpretation.
In contrast, we advocate a prescriptive interpretation. We elaborate on this in Section 7,
but it is worth summarising our reasons for favouring this approach here. First, a descrip-
tive interpretation seems to require (at least in its obvious implementation) a meta-level
approach, or failing that, an expensive encoding at the object level (Section 6). This is due
to the fact that one wants to find a scenario (i.e., extension) in which the most preferred
default(s) are applied, enabled perhaps via the application of other, arbitrary, defaults. In
contrast, in the prescriptive approach, one may generate an extension, and be guaranteed
that it represents a scenario in which the most preferred default(s) that can be applied are
applied. Second, there are interesting ordered default theories where, in a prescriptive in-
terpretation, one can guarantee the existence of a most-preferred extension, generated by
a strictly iterative process (see Theorem 4.6). Hence there is reason to believe that a pre-
scriptive interpretation will generally be more efficient than a descriptive interpretation
(even though the respective complexity classes may be the same) and specific instances in
which it is guaranteed to be much more efficient. In addition, if a descriptive interpretation
uses a meta-level approach then adjudicating among different preference orderings, choos-
ing preferences by default, and all the generalities discussed above must be determined at
the meta-level. In contrast, with our prescriptive approach, we can axiomatise within our
theory how we want different preference orders to interact.
Lastly, a prescriptive interpretation arguably comes with more representational “force”
and allows a “tighter” characterisation of a domain. This is illustrated by the example
(4). Here the prescriptive interpretation appears to give a curious result. However, we
argue the problem is not with a prescriptive interpretation per se, but rather with the
encoding of the example. The default A :BB has highest priority, but this default can only
be applied if the prerequisite is proved; one way that this can come about is by applying
the default :AA . But then it would seem that
:A
A should be considered first and thus have
higher priority than A :BB , since it enables the application of this default. Second, there is
no situation in which A :BB can be applied and
:A
A cannot. Thus, while the default
:A
A may
be pragmatically less “important” than A :BB in a theory, the inference structure of default
logic is such that :AA cannot be applied after
A :B
B .
5 Yet this is what the order < in (4)
stipulates. An analogy may be made with proving a theorem: a theorem (by analogy: A :BB )
may be “important” and lemmas (by analogy: :AA )may be less “important”, but one way or
another the lemmas are proved before the theorem can be proved. Hence we argue that (4),
while syntactically well-formed, is of questionable meaning. More generally, a prescriptive
interpretation forces a knowledge base designer to be explicit about what things should be
applied in what order. A descriptive interpretation on the other hand simply gives a “wish
list” of preferences which may or may not be meaningful. We return to and elaborate on
these points at the end of the paper in Section 7, where we compare our approach with
others.
5 That is, one cannot have a grounded enumeration of the generating defaults (Definition 2.1) in which A :BB is
applied before :AA .
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4. Static preferences on defaults
We show here how ordered default theories can be translated into standard default
theories. Our strategy is to add sufficient “tags” to a default rule in a theory to enable
the control of rule application. This is comparable to the usage of abnormality predicates
in circumscription [26]. We are given an ordered default theory (D,W,<) which is then
translated into a regular default theory (D′,W ′) such that the explicit preferences in < are
“compiled” into D′ and W ′.
We begin by associating a unique name with each default rule. This is done by extending
the original language by a set of constants 6 N such that there is a bijective mapping
n : D → N . We write nδ instead of n(δ) (and we often abbreviate nδi by ni to ease
notation). Also, for default rule δ along with its name n, we sometimes write n : δ to render
naming explicit. To encode the fact that we deal with a finite set of distinct default rules,
we adopt a unique names assumption (UNAN ) and domain closure assumption (DCAN )
with respect to N . That is, for a name set N = {n1, . . . , nm}, we add axioms
UNAN : (ni 6= nj ) for all ni, nj ∈N with i 6= j
DCAN : ∀x. name(x)≡ (x = n1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = nm).
For convenience, we write ∀x ∈N. P(x) instead of ∀x. name(x)⊃ P(x).
The use of names allows the expression of preference relations between default rules
in the object language. So we assert that default nj : αj :βjγj is preferred to ni :
αi :βi
γi
by
ni ≺ nj , where ≺ is a (new) predicate in the object language. Finally, in discussions of
preference relations we sometimes write δi < δj or αi :βiγi <
αj :βj
γj
to show a preference
between two defaults; however it should be kept in mind that these latter expressions are
not expressions within a default theory (as are given by ≺), but expressions about a default
theory.
Given δi < δj , we want to ensure that before δi is applied, that δj be applied or found
to be inapplicable. 7 We do this by first translating default rules so that rule application can
be explicitly controlled. For this purpose, we need to be able to, first, detect when a rule
has been applied or when a rule is blocked, and, second, control the application of a rule
based on other antecedent conditions. For a default rule α :β
γ
, there are two cases for it to
not be applied: it may be that the antecedent is not known to be true (and so its negation
is consistent), or it may be that the justification is not consistent (and so its negation is
known to be true). For detecting this case, we introduce a new, special-purpose predicate
bl(·). Similarly we introduce a special-purpose predicate ap(·) to detect the case where a
rule has been applied. For controlling application of a rule we introduce predicate ok(·).
Then, a default rule δ = α :β
γ
is mapped to
α ∧ ok(nδ) : β
γ ∧ ap(nδ) ,
ok(nδ) : ¬α
bl(nδ)
,
¬β ∧ ok(nδ) :
bl(nδ)
. (5)
6 McCarthy in [26] first suggested naming defaults using a set of aspect functions. See also [8]. Theorist [30]
uses atomic propositions to name defaults.
7 That is, we wish to exclude the case where δi ∈GDn and δj ∈GDm for n6m in Definition 2.1.
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These rules are sometimes abbreviated by δa, δb1, δb2 , respectively. While δa is more or
less the image of the original rule δ, rules δb1 and δb2 capture the aforementioned situation
of non-applicability.
None of the three rules in (5) can be applied unless ok(nδ) is true. Since ok(·) is a
new predicate symbol, it can be expressly made true in order to potentially enable the
application of the three rules in the image of the translation. If ok(nδ) is true, the first
rule of the translation may potentially be applied. If a rule has been applied, then this is
indicated by assertion ap(nδ). The last two rules give conditions under which the original
rule is inapplicable: either the negation of the original antecedent α is consistent (with
the extension) or the justification β is known to be false; in either such case bl(nδ) is
concluded.
This translation says nothing about which defaults are “considered” in an ordering before
others. However, for δi < δj we can now fully control the order of rule application: if δj
has been applied (and so ap(nj ) is true), or known to be inapplicable (and so bl(nj ) is true),
then it’s ok to apply δi . So we would have something like (ap(nj )∨ bl(nj ))⊃ ok(ni), but
adjusted to allow for the fact that there might be other rules with higher priority than δi .
The idea is thus to delay the consideration of less preferred rules until the applicability
question has been settled for the respective higher ranked rules.
Taking all this into account, we obtain the following translation, mapping ordered default
theories in some language L onto standard default theories in the language L+ obtained
by extending L by new predicates symbols (· ≺ ·), ok(·), bl(·), and ap(·), and a set of
associated default names:
Definition 4.1. Given an ordered default theory (D,W,<) over L and its set of default
names N = {nδ | δ ∈D}, define T ((D,W,<))= (D′,W ′) over L+ by
D′ =
{
α ∧ ok(n) : β
γ ∧ ap(n) ,
ok(n) : ¬α
bl(n)
,
¬β ∧ ok(n) :
bl(n)
∣∣∣∣n : α : βγ ∈D
}
∪D≺,
W ′ = W ∪W≺ ∪ {DCAN,UNAN },
where
D≺ =
{ : ¬(x ≺ y)
¬(x ≺ y)
}
,
W≺ =
{
nδ ≺ nδ′ | (δ, δ′) ∈<
}
∪ {ok(n>)}
∪ {∀x ∈N. [∀y ∈N. (x ≺ y)⊃ (bl(y)∨ ap(y))]⊃ ok(x)}.
W ′ contains prior world knowledge W , together with assertions for managing the
priority order < on defaults. The first part of W≺ specifies that ≺ is a predicate whose
positive instances mirror those of the strict partial order <. ok(n>) asserts that it is ok
to apply the maximally preferred (trivial) default. The third formula in W≺ controls the
application of defaults: for every ni , we derive ok(ni) whenever for every nj with ni ≺ nj ,
either ap(nj ) or bl(nj ) is true. This axiom allows us to derive ok(ni), indicating that δi may
potentially be applied whenever we have for all δj with δi < δj that δj has been applied or
cannot be applied.
J.P. Delgrande, T. Schaub / Artificial Intelligence 123 (2000) 41–87 49
This alone gives necessary but not sufficient conditions for rendering δi potentially
applicable. If (δi, δj ) /∈ < then (ni ≺ nj ) /∈W≺; however, for the last formula in W≺ to
work properly we must be able to conclude (in the extension) that ¬(ni ≺ nj ). This is
addressed by adding the default rule in D≺ that renders the resulting theory complete
with respect to priority statements. That is, for all resulting extensions E we have that
(ni ≺ nj ) ∈E or ¬(ni ≺ nj ) ∈E. We also have (nδ ≺ n>) ∈W ′ for every rule δ 6= δ> by
the definition of ordered default theories. Since < is a strict partial order,W ′ also includes
the transitive closure of ≺ and no reflexivities such as n≺ n.
Note that the translation results in a manageable increase in the size of the default theory.
For ordered theory (D,W,<), the translation T ((D,W,<)) is only a constant factor larger
than (D,W,<). 8
As an example, consider the defaults:
n1 : A1 : B1
C1
, n2 : A2 : B2
C2
, n3 : A3 : B3
C3
, n> : > : >> .
We obtain for i = 1,2,3:
Ai ∧ ok(ni) : Bi
Ci ∧ ap(ni) ,
ok(ni) : ¬Ai
bl(ni)
,
¬Bi ∧ ok(ni) :
bl(ni)
,
and analogously for δ> where Ai,Bi,Ci are >. Given δ1 < δ2 < δ3, we obtain n1 ≺ n2,
n2 ≺ n3, n1 ≺ n3 along with nk ≺ n> for k ∈ {1,2,3} as part of W≺. From D≺ we get
¬(ni ≺ nj ) for all remaining combinations of i, j ∈ {1,2,3,>}. It is instructive to verify
that ok(n3), along with(
ap(n3)∨ bl(n3)
)⊃ ok(n2), and((
ap(n2)∨ bl(n2)
)∧ (ap(n3)∨ bl(n3)))⊃ ok(n1)
are obtained after a few iterations in Definition 2.1 (see below); from this we get that n3
must be taken into account first, followed by n2 and then n1.
For illustration, we provide in Fig. 1 traces of extension constructions based on the
pseudo-iterative specification given in Definition 2.1:
Given W = {A1,A2,A3}, we obtain the trace of conclusions given in the left column
of Fig. 1. The trace demonstrates how the successive introduction of ok-literals allows for
navigating the consecutive consideration of rules along the given preferences. The delay
between the application of the individual rules is due to the fact that in Definition 2.1 the
deductive closure of Ei is determined at Ei+1.
Next, consider where W also contains C3 ⊃ ¬B2 and C2 ⊃ ¬B3. The corresponding
trace is given in the middle column of Fig. 1. We get (δ2)b2 ∈GD5 instead of (δ2)a ∈GD5;
therefore, also bl(n2) ∈E6 instead of C2∧ap(n2) ∈E6. This is because¬B2 ∈E. Suppose
there is an extension containing C2 ∧ ¬B3 as opposed to C3 ∧ ¬B2. As before, we
obtain ok(n3) ∈ E3. Since we have ¬B3 in our putative extension, against which we
check consistency, (δ3)a is inapplicable. Also, (δ3)b1 is inapplicable, since A3 belongs
to the given facts. Finally, not even (δ3)b2 is applicable since ¬B3 is not derivable,
although it belongs to the putative extension. So, since we can neither derive ap(n3)
8 This assumes we count the default in D≺ as a single default.
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i Ei GDi
0 ok(n>)
A1,A2,A3
1 >∧ ok(n>) (δ>)a
2 >∧ ap(n>)
3 ap(n>)
ok(n3)
A3 ∧ ok(n3) (δ3)a
4 C3 ∧ ap(n3)
5 C3, ap(n3)
ok(n2)
A2 ∧ ok(n2) (δ2)a
6 C2 ∧ ap(n2)
7 C2, ap(n2)
ok(n1)
A1 ∧ ok(n1) (δ1)a
8 C1 ∧ ap(n1)
9 C1, ap(n1)
i Ei GDi
0 ok(n>)
A1,A2,A3
C3 ⊃¬B2
C2 ⊃¬B3
1 >∧ ok(n>) (δ>)a
2 >∧ ap(n>)
3 ap(n>)
ok(n3)
A3 ∧ ok(n3) (δ3)a
4 C3 ∧ ap(n3)
5 C3, ap(n3)
ok(n2), ¬B2
¬B2 ∧ ok(n2) (δ2)b2
6 bl(n2)
7
ok(n1)
A1 ∧ ok(n1) (δ1)a
8 C1 ∧ ap(n1)
9 C1, ap(n1)
i Ei GDi
0 ok(n>)
A1, A3
1 >∧ ok(n>) (δ>)a
2 >∧ ap(n>)
3 ap(n>)
ok(n3)
A3 ∧ ok(n3) (δ3)a
4 C3 ∧ ap(n3)
5 C3, ap(n3)
ok(n2) (δ2)b1
6 bl(n2)
7
ok(n1)
A1 ∧ ok(n1) (δ1)a
12 C1 ∧ ap(n1)
13 C1, ap(n1)
Fig. 1. Tracing the pseudo-iterative definition.
nor bl(n3), the pseudo-iterative process is interrupted; we cannot derive ok(n2) and thus
¬B3 cannot belong to any Ei . This behaviour nicely reflects the fact that rules (to be
more precise, their justifications) can only be blocked by higher-ranked rules, since the
application of lower-ranked rules is delayed until applicability has been settled for their
predecessors.
Finally, consider the case where the prerequisite of the second default rule, A2, is
missing. The corresponding trace is given in the right column of Fig. 1. As opposed to
the two previous scenarios, we now get (δ2)b1 in GD5.
The following theorem summarises the major technical properties of our approach, and
demonstrate that rules are applied in the desired order:
Theorem 4.1. Let E be a consistent extension of T ((D,W,<)) for ordered default theory
(D,W,<). We have for all δ, δ′ ∈D that
(1) nδ ≺ nδ′ ∈E iff ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈E;
(2) ok(nδ) ∈E;
(3) ap(nδ) ∈E iff bl(nδ) /∈E;
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(4) ok(nδ) ∈Ei and Prereq(δ) ∈Ej and ¬Justif (δ) /∈E implies ap(nδ) ∈Emax(i,j)+3;
(5) ok(nδ) ∈Ei and Prereq(δ) /∈E implies bl(nδ) ∈Ei+1;
(6) ok(nδ) ∈Ei and ¬Justif (δ) ∈E implies bl(nδ) ∈Ej for some j > i + 1;
(7) ok(nδ) /∈ Ei−1 and ok(nδ) ∈ Ei implies ap(nδ) /∈Ej for j < i + 2 and bl(nδ) /∈Ej
for j < i .
While Theorem 4.1(2) guarantees that we consider all default rules inD, Theorem 4.1(3)
reflects the fact that extensions contain complete knowledge about the application of
the rules in D. Among the more procedural propositions, Theorem 4.1(5) shows that
our approach allows us to detect blockage due to non-derivability of the prerequisite
immediately after having the “ok” for the default at hand. The remaining properties
provide a detailed account of the technical intuitions underlying our approach: as with
all default logics, we consider all default rules during the consideration of rules with lower
preference.
This is made more precise in the following theorem, by adopting a rule-based
perspective. For an extension E and its generating default rules GD(D,E), we trivially
have δa ∈ GD(D,E) iff ap(nδ) ∈ E, and δb1 ∈ GD(D,E) or δb2 ∈ GD(D,E) iff
bl(nδ) ∈E.
Theorem 4.2. Let E be a consistent extension of T ((D,W,<)) = (D′,W ′) for ordered
default theory (D,W,<) and GDi be defined with respect to E and (D′,W ′). Then, we
have for all δ ∈D
(8) δa ∈GD(D′,E) iff (δb1 /∈GD(D′,E) and δb2 /∈GD(D′,E)).
For all default rules δ, δ′ ∈D such that δ < δ′, we have
(9) δ′a, δ′b1, δ′b2 /∈GDi implies δa, δb1, δb2 /∈GDj for j < i + 3;
(10) δ′a ∈ GDi or δ′b1 ∈GDi or δ′b2 ∈GDi implies δa ∈ GDj or δb1 ∈GDj or
δb2 ∈GDj for some j > i + 2;
(11) δa ∈ GDi or δb1 ∈GDi or δb2 ∈GDi implies δ′a ∈ GDj or δ′b1 ∈GDj or
δ′b2 ∈GDj for some j < i − 2.
Unlike the above, the last series of results focuses on the successive application of
lower and higher ranked rules. As already observable in the traces in Fig. 1, the minimum
three-step delay between rules stemming from δ and those originated by δ′ is due
to the belated formation of deductive closure in Definition 2.1. The important overall
consequence of this series of results is that our translation provides full control over default
application.
4.1. Semantical underpinnings
So far, we have described our approach in rather specific, technical terms, so that the
question about more general properties arises. To begin with, a more global and systematic
view of the machinery put forward by our translation is obtainable by combining the
previously given results:
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Theorem 4.3. Let (D,W,<) be an ordered default theory and let E be a set of formulas.
IfE is a consistent extension of T ((D,W,<))= (D′,W ′) then we have for all grounded
enumerations 〈ζi〉i∈I of GD(D′,E) and for all δ, δ′ ∈D:
If δ < δ′, then j < i for all ζi = δt and some 9 ζj = (δ′)t ′ with t, t ′ ∈ {a, b1, b2}.
Thus a grounded enumeration for an extension of the translated defaults conforms to the
ordering given on the initial set of defaults.
Moreover, it turns out that our translation T amounts to selecting those extensions of the
original default theory that are in accord with the provided ordering. This can be expressed
in the following way.
Definition 4.2. Let (D,W) be a default theory and let<⊆D ×D be a strict partial order.
An extension E of (D,W) is <-preserving if there exists a grounded enumeration
〈δi〉i∈I of GD(D,E) such that for all i, j ∈ I and δ ∈D \GD(D,E), we have that
(1) if δi < δj then j < i , and
(2) if δi < δ then Prereq(δ) /∈E or W ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) `¬Justif (δ).
From the perspective of δi , the two conditions distinguish between present and absent
higher-ranked rules. In the former case, an ordering < prescribes that the preferred rule
δj must be applied before δi , while its absence is only tolerable if either its prerequisite is
not derivable (at all) or its justification is refuted by other, even higher-ranked rules. In any
case, the applicability issue must first be settled for higher-ranked default rules before it is
addressable for lower-ranked rules. This conception of prescriptive preference is mirrored
by our translation of ordered theories into regular theories.
Theorem 4.4. Let (D,W) be a default theory and let <⊆D ×D be a strict partial order.
Let E be a set of formulas.
We have thatE is a <-preserving extension of (D,W) iff E =E′ ∩L for some extension
E′ of T ((D,W,<)).
The notion of<-preservation not only provides a semantics for our approach, but it may
also be seen as a general semantical account for prescriptive preferences among defeasible
rules.
By the above theorem, it is clear that any extension of a translated default theory is a
regular extension of the underlying unordered default theory:
Corollary 4.1. Let (D,W,<) be an ordered default theory over L.
If E is an extension of T ((D,W,<)) then E ∩L is an extension of (D,W).
Also, the approach is equivalent (modulo the original language) to standard default logic
if there are no preferences:
9 This is because there are cases, where both δb1 and δb2 apply.
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Corollary 4.2. For a default theory (D,W) over L and a set of formulas E, we have that
E is an extension of (D,W) iff E =E′ ∩L for some extension E′ of T ((D,W,∅)).
4.2. The existence of extensions
Given the above theorems, one might expect that ordered default theories would enjoy
the same properties as standard default logic. This is indeed the case, but with one
important exception: normal ordered default theories do not guarantee the existence of
extensions. For example, the image of the ordered default theory (under our translation)({
n1 : : B
B
, n2 : B : C
C
}
,∅, {δ1 < δ2}
)
(6)
has no extension. Informally the problem is that we have a preference δ1 < δ2. However, if
W = ∅, only default δ1 is applicable, and once it has applied, δ2 becomes applicable. Thus
we have an ordering implicit in the form of the defaults and world knowledge, but where
this implicit ordering is contradicted by the assertion δ1 < δ2. Not surprisingly then there
is no extension.
In more detail, our translation gives us (among other things) the following information:
ok(n1) : B
B ∧ ap(n1) ,
B ∧ ok(n2) : C
C ∧ ap(n2) ,
ok(n2) : ¬B
bl(n2)
,(
ap(n2)∨ bl(n2)
)⊃ ok(n1). (7)
If E is an extension of the translated theory, then in Definition 4.1 we will have for some
i (in fact i = 3) that ok(n2) ∈ Ei and ok(n1) /∈ Ei . Only the third default in (7) may
potentially be applied. The assumption thatB ∈E leads to an immediate contradiction: this
would block application of the third default, no default is applicable, and so B /∈ E. Since
B /∈E the third default is applicable and we conclude bl(n2) ∈E4, hence ok(n1) ∈E5. But
now the first default in (7) is applicable; we derive B , hence B ∈E, contradiction.
From a declarative point of view, we see that the single regular extension of (6), viz.
Th({B,C}), is generated by the grounded sequence 〈δ1, δ2〉. This extension however is not
<-preserving, since its sequence of generating default rules violates the given preference
ordering. 10 Conversely, the only sequence compatible with <, namely 〈δ2, δ1〉, is not
grounded and it is therefore not legitimate. So, we are faced with an explicit preference
order that is incompatible with the implicit application order. In the example, this implicit
order was induced by the inferential relation between one default rule’s consequent and
another’s prerequisite. There is, however, a second source for such an implicit ordering,
given by the blocking of a rule. That is, one rule’s consequent may imply the negation of
another’s justification. To see this, consider the following theory:({
n1 : : B
B
, n2 : : C ∧¬B
C
}
,∅, {δ1 < δ2}
)
. (8)
As above, this theory has no<-preserving extension. To see this, note that its single regular
extension, viz. Th({B}), is generated by 〈δ1〉. This sequence violates condition (2) of
10 To be precise, it violates condition (1) in Definition 4.2.
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Definition 4.2, since the inapplicability of the higher-ranked rule δ2 is not justifiable in the
absence of the lower-ranked rule δ1. One way to address this problem is to replace rigid
preferences by preferences that apply by default only. An approach which would permit
this is detailed in Section 5. However we suggest that (6) and (8) are incoherent in some
sense, and the lack of extension indicates a problem in the specification of the original
theory.
We can make this notion more precise by relating our approach to that of [28], which
characterises a class of default theories that always have extensions. In [28], a graph
G((D,W)) is constructed from a default theory where default rules are the nodes, and
directed edges reflect “positive” and “negative” influences of one rule on another. Our
main result is that if a default theory is of this class that is guaranteed to have an extension,
and if our ordering< does not conflict with an edge inG((D,W)), then the ordered default
theory has an extension.
We assume for the remainder of this section that we are dealing with propositional
default theories only. That is, in both an original theory and the translated theory, we have
propositional formulas only. Hence (former) atomic formulas such as ok(n) and ni ≺ nj
are regarded as propositional atoms. We can do this since we assume that we have a finite
set of default rules with a finite set of instances. Assume further that formulas are expressed
in conjunctive normal form. To be sure, our axiomatisation of Definition 4.1 loses much
of its interest (and so for instance the partial order ≺ becomes a set of unrelated atomic
sentences) but the point remains that we can use this to characterise ordered theories having
extensions.
Papadimitriou and Sideri [28] present the following results. For semi-normal default
theory (D,W) define its literal graph L((D,W)) as the graph with nodes consisting of
literals in the theory, and where (x, y) is a directed edge if both ¬x and y appear in the
same clause of W or of a consequent of D. L∗(x, y) indicates that there is a path from x
to y in L((D,W)). Intuitively the graph indicates what literals may contribute to the proof
of others in the context of the default theory.
From this another graphG((D,W))= (D,E), which we will call the dependency graph,
is defined where the vertices are default rules from D, E = E0 ∪ E1, and E0 and E1 are
disjoint. Informally (δ, δ′) ∈ E0 if the application of δ may help bring about the application
of δ′, and (δ, δ′) ∈ E1 if the application of δ may help prevent the application of δ′.
Formally:
(1) (δ, δ′) ∈ E0 if there is a literal x appearing positively in the consequent of δ, a literal
y appearing positively in the prerequisite of δ′, and L∗(x, y).
(2) (δ, δ′) ∈ E1 if there is a literal x appearing positively in the consequent of δ, a literal
y appearing negatively in the justification or in the consequent of δ′, and L∗(x, y).
Observe that the information provided by E0 and E1 (along with the underlying
distinction) amounts to a formalisation of the implicit application orderings discussed
above (along with their two different sources).
Edges in E0 are assigned 0 weight and edges in E1 are assigned a weight of 1. Default
theory (D,W) is even if all cycles in G((D,W)) have total weight that is even (i.e., there
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are no cycles with an odd number of edges from E1). Their main result says that every even
default theory has an extension. Given this result, we obtain:
Theorem 4.5. Let (D,W,<) be a propositional, semi-normal, ordered default theory such
that (D,W) is even and for the associated dependency graph G((D,W)) = (D,E), we
have that if C is a cycle of (D,E ∪ {(δ′, δ) | δ < δ′}) then C is a cycle of (D,E).
Then T ((D,W,<)) has an extension.
Thus (D,E ∪ {(δ′, δ) | δ < δ′}) has no new cycles incorporating elements of <. The
dependency graph reflects dependencies among the default rules, specifically which rules
may help block or activate others. Papadimitriou and Sideri [28] show that theories obeying
certain constraints have an extension; we show that an ordered theory where the ordering
doesn’t contradict one of these constraints also has an extension.
Now we can make precise why we consider theories (6) and (8) to be incoherent.
First, we observe that both underlying default theories are even. For the standard theory
underlying (6), we get a dependency graph with arc set E = E0 ∪ E1 = {(δ1, δ2)} ∪ ∅.
Together with the preference δ1 < δ2 from (6), we obtain arc set E ∪ {(δ2, δ1)} that
includes the new cycle formed by (δ1, δ2) and (δ2, δ1). Consider how this is reflected in
the translated theory: Let E ′ = E ′0 ∪ E ′1 be the arc set of the dependency graph in the
translated default theory T ((D,W,<)). As the proof of Theorem 4.5 shows, there are
many arcs in E ′0, most of them in a sense redundant, in that they cannot contribute to a
cycle. However, two arcs are of crucial importance in the translated theory of (6). We get(
ok(n2) : ¬B
bl(n2)
,
ok(n1) : B
B ∧ ap(n1)
)
∈ E ′0
resulting from (bl(n2),ok(n1)) being in the literal graph of the translated theory, reflecting
the preference of δ2 over δ1. We also get(
ok(n1) : B
B ∧ ap(n1) ,
ok(n2) : ¬B
bl(n2)
)
∈ E ′1
by virtue of the occurrences of B in the consequent and its negation in the justification of
the rules. These two edges form an odd cycle (that is, a cycle with weight 1) and so the
applicability condition of [28] fails here. Note how this reflects our earlier intuitions. The
first arc is a result of the preference of δ2 over δ1; the second results from the possibility of
δ1 activating δ2.
In (8) something similar happens. In the underlying standard theory we get a dependency
graph with arc set E = E0 ∪ E1 = ∅ ∪ {(δ1, δ2)}. Incorporating the arc (δ2, δ1) induced by
δ1 < δ2 gives an extended arc set possessing a new cycle. In fact, in the translated theory
we get edges(
ok(n1) : B
B ∧ ap(n1) ,
ok(n2) : C ∧¬B
C ∧ ap(n2)
)
∈ E ′1 and(
ok(n2) : C ∧¬B
C ∧ ap(n2) ,
ok(n1) : B
B ∧ ap(n1)
)
∈ E ′0
again yielding an odd cycle. The first edge is a result of δ1 “canceling” δ2; the second
reflects the preference of δ2 over δ1.
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A further useful consequence follows. Its proof is independent of the Papadimitriou and
Sideri result, and instead relies on the fact that normal default theories have extensions. Let
Pred(S) be the set of predicate symbols occurring in a set of formulas S.
Theorem 4.6. Let (D,W,<) be a normal, ordered default theory such that
Pred
(
Prereq(D)
)∩ Pred(Conseq(D))= ∅ and
Pred(W) ∩ Pred(Conseq(D))= ∅.
Then T ((D,W,<)) has an extension.
Here we have a class of default theories where the default conclusions are independent
of the rule prerequisites, and so represent new default information. The second condition
excludes the expression of such “dependencies” viaW . Hence the theory with :q
q
<
:p
p
for
atomic sentences p, q , and with W = ∅ is acceptable, whereas the same preference with
W = {p≡ q} is not.
Note that the proofs of the above theorems show that, as a corollary, an extension E is
found by a purely iterative process. Hence, in select cases, extensions of ordered default
theories may be (relatively) efficiently generated.
5. Dynamic preferences on defaults
We now consider situations where the presence of preferences is context-dependent. We
deal with standard default theories (D,W) over a language already including a predicate
≺ expressing a preference relation by means of default names. In order to keep a finite
domain closure axiom, we restrict ourselves to a finite set of default rules D which is in a
1–1 correspondence with a finite name set N .
Since preferences are now available dynamically by inferences from W and D, we
lack a priori complete information about the ordering predicate ≺. This a priori complete
information was available in the rigid case since we were given all positive instances of
the explicit order < between rules and the “closed world default” :¬(x≺y)¬(x≺y) for negative
instances. However this leads to a problem if we allow positive preferences by default.
Consider where our only preference is given by :n≺m
n≺m . Intuitively if we have no other
preference information, this default should be applicable. However we also have the
“closed world” default for preferences, given in D≺ above, that asserts that if there is no
known or derived preference between rules, then no preference exists. An instance ofD≺ is:¬(n≺m)
¬(n≺m) . So if we simply have these two defaults then we run the risk of potentially having
an unwanted extension where :¬(n≺m)¬(n≺m) applies over
:n≺m
n≺m . Obviously we cannot solve the
problem by asserting that :¬(n≺m)¬(n≺m) <
: n≺m
n≺m since our approach would now be circular. We
address this issue by adding a new binary predicate ⊀ indicating that for defaults δ and δ′
neither (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈E nor ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈E for a given extension E. We add the following
rule, where x, y are variables ranging over default names:
: ¬(x ≺ y), (x ≺ y)
(x ⊀ y)
. (9)
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This rule accounts for situations where neither (x ≺ y) nor ¬(x ≺ y) is derivable. That
is for names n and m, the only time this rule will apply is when n ≺ m /∈ E and
¬(n≺m) /∈E. So, since⊀ is an introduced predicate, the only time we have n⊀m ∈E is
when the default theory has no information on whether the two defaults are in a preference
relation or not.
We now consider standard default theories in a language L including the set of default
names and propositions formed by binary predicate ≺ applied to variables and default
names only; these are mapped onto theories in the language L? obtained by extending L
with new predicate symbols (·⊀ ·), ok(·), bl(·), and ap(·):
Definition 5.1. Given a default theory (D,W) over L and its set of default names
N = {nδ | δ ∈D}, we define D((D,W)) = (D′,W ′) over L? by
D′ =
{
α ∧ ok(n) : β
γ ∧ ap(n) ,
ok(n) : ¬α
bl(n)
,
¬β ∧ ok(n) :
bl(n)
∣∣∣∣n : α : βγ ∈D
}
∪D≺,
W ′ = W ∪W≺ ∪ {DCAN,UNAN },
where
D≺ =
{ : ¬(x ≺ y), (x ≺ y)
(x ⊀ y)
}
,
W≺ =
{∀x ∈N.¬(x ≺ x)}
∪ {∀xyz ∈N. ((x ≺ y)∧ (y ≺ z))⊃ (x ≺ z)}
∪ {∀x ∈N. (x 6= n>)⊃ (x ≺ n>)}
∪ {ok(n>)}
∪ {∀x ∈N. (∀y ∈N. (x ⊀ y)∨ [(x ≺ y)⊃ (bl(y)∨ ap(y))])⊃ ok(x)}.
In contrast to Definition 4.1, D and W now may contain preference information
expressed by ≺ applied to default names. The first three axioms in W≺ account for
information that was implicitly provided by ordered default theories in the rigid case.
The last axiom is a straightforward extension of that found in the rigid case, now also
accounting for the information provided by the default rule in D≺.
Again, we observe that for ordered theory (D,W), the translation D((D,W)) is only a
constant factor larger than (D,W). We note that Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 carry over
to the general case except for Theorem 4.1(1). We get instead
(1′) either nδ ≺ nδ′ ∈E or ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈E or nδ ⊀ nδ′ ∈E.
In fact, ordered default theories are treated in the same way by our basic and general
approach, except for different augmented languages:
Theorem 5.1. Let (D,W,<) be an ordered default theory over L.
For each extension E of T ((D,W,<)) there is an extension E′ of D((D,W ∪ {nδ ≺
nδ′ | (δ, δ′) ∈<})) such that E ∩L=E′ ∩L and vice versa.
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Together with Corollary 4.2, this result implies that our dynamic approach yields
all regular extensions (modulo the original language) if (D,W) does not contain an
occurrence of ≺:
Theorem 5.2. For a default theory (D,W) over a language L excluding ≺-symbols, and
a set of formulas E, we have that
E is an extension of (D,W) iff E =E′ ∩L for some extension E′ of D((D,W)).
The notion of <-preservation is not directly applicable to the dynamic case. This is
because there is no adequate counterpart of a ‘regular extension of the original theory’
since the preference information is only fully developed in the extensions of the image
of the translation. Nonetheless, we can provide an analogous criterion being invariantly
satisfied by all extensions obtained after our translation:
Theorem 5.3. Let (D,W) be an ordered default theory and let E be a set of formulas.
If E is a consistent extension ofD((D,W)) then we have for all grounded enumerations
〈ζi〉i∈I of GD(D,E) and for all δ, δ′ ∈D:
If (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈E then j < i for all ζi = δt and some ζj = (δ′)t ′
with t, t ′ ∈ {a, b1, b2}.
As argued above, there is no sensible correspondence to regular extensions in a dynamic
setting since preferences are present in both the original and resulting theory. Thus, there
is no counterpart for Corollary 4.1 in the dynamic case.
The advantage of dynamic preferences over static ones is that they allow for specifying
context-sensitive preferences, where the context is spanned by the encompassing extension.
In fact, the dynamic setting does not necessarily furnish “softer” preferences than
obtainable in the static case. Dynamic preferences do rather provide additional means for
canceling preferences in certain cases. Clearly, a theory like({
n1 : : B
B
, n2 : : ¬B¬B , n21 :
: n1 ≺ n2
n1 ≺ n2
}
,∅
)
yields a single extension containing ¬B . Adding n2 ≺ n1 as a fact results in a single
extension with B . Adding instead a default rule such as n12 : :n2≺n1n2≺n1 gives rise to two
extensions, one with B and one with ¬B . The important thing to note is that the two last
additions gave rise to alternative contexts, that is, in both cases ¬(n1 ≺ n2) was derivable,
first in an overriding way (in W ), then as included in an alternative extension.
If no such default alternative is provided, dynamic preferences are as rigid as static ones.
To see this, let us reconsider theories (6) and (8) in a dynamic setting:({
n1 : : B
B
, n2 : B : C
C
, n21 : : n1 ≺ n2
n1 ≺ n2
}
,∅
)
, (10)({
n1 : : B
B
, n2 : : C ∧¬B
C
, n21 : : n1 ≺ n2
n1 ≺ n2
}
,∅
)
. (11)
J.P. Delgrande, T. Schaub / Artificial Intelligence 123 (2000) 41–87 59
As in the static case, the images of both theories do not possess any extensions. This is
because there is simply no way to refute the preference imposed by the third default rule.
If this was possible, we would get unwanted preferences, as argued at the start of this
section when motivatingD≺.
So, it should be clear that if one wants to suspend dynamic preferences in certain
contexts, one has to provide a specification for these contexts. One way of doing this is to
equip rules with dynamic preferences with predicates playing the same role as abnormality
predicates in circumscription [26]. For implementing this option in the above examples,
we could replace
nyx : : nx ≺ ny
nx ≺ ny by p(y, x) :
: (nx ≺ ny)∧¬ko(p(y, x))
nx ≺ ny
and supply a corresponding blocking policy, comparable to circumscription policies. In
the case of (10), one could fix the problem by means of ∀x, y ∈ N. ap(nx) ∧ ap(ny) ⊃
ko(p(y, x)), that is, by canceling preferences between non-conflicting rules. Alternately
one could adopt a different strategy by putting:
∀x, y ∈N. (Conseq(δx)⊃ Prereq(δy))⊃ ko(p(y, x)).
This axiom ranks derivability over preference (see Section 4.2). One could similarly rank
blockage over preference in addressing the lack of extensions in (11):
∀x, y ∈N. (Conseq(δx)⊃¬Justif (δy))⊃ ko(p(y, x)).
Of course, our axiomatic approach leaves room for many other policies.
5.1. Examples
To further illustrate our approach, we consider two extended examples, taken from the
literature. The first is given by Junker in [22]: 11
“Jim and Jane have the following habits:
1. Normally, Jim and Jane go to at most one attraction when they go out in an
evening.
2. Jim prefers the theatre to the night club.
3. Jane prefers the night club to the theatre.
4. If Jim invites Jane then he respects her preferences (and vice versa).
5. Normally Jim invites Jane.
6. An exception to 1. is Saturday.
7. An exception to 5. is Jim’s birthday, where Jane invites Jim.
If no further information is given we conclude that Jim and Jane will go to the night
club. When we learn that Jim has birthday we revise this and conclude that they go
to the theatre. However, the day in question is a Saturday. Hence, they should go to
both attractions. Finally the news tells that the theatre is closed for work. Thus we
again conclude that they go to the night club.”
11 A resemblance to existing persons is accidental and not in accord with the intention of the authors.
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We adapt Junker’s modelling as follows:
ntheatre : : goto(theatre)∧¬closed(theatre)goto(theatre) , (12)
nnight-club : : goto(night-club)∧¬closed(night-club)goto(night-club) , (13)
nevenings : : ¬(goto(theatre)∧ goto(night-club))∧¬party-night¬(goto(theatre)∧ goto(night-club)) , (14)
njane : invites(jim, jane) : ntheatre ≺ nnight-club
ntheatre ≺ nnight-club , (15)
njim : invites(jane, jim) : nnight-club ≺ ntheatre
nnight-club ≺ ntheatre , (16)
ninvitation : : invites(jim, jane)invites(jim, jane) , (17)
saturday⊃ party-night, (18)
birthday(jim)⊃ invites(jane, jim), (19)
invites(jim, jane)⊃¬invites(jane, jim), (20)
closed(theatre)⊃¬goto(theatre), (21)
∀x ∈N. (goto(x)⊃ (nx ≺ nevenings)), (22)
∀x ∈N. (goto(x)⊃ (nx ≺ ninvitation)). (23)
Recall that nx is simply an abbreviation for n(x). The choice where to go, is formalised
by means of default rules δtheatre and δnight-club. Both spots are supposed to be open, unless
they are known to be closed. Observe that both δjane and δjim model a combination of above
statements 2 and 3 with 4, respectively. So, δjane tells us that Jane’s preferences hold since
Jim is inviting her. Finally, following [22], we give in (22)–(23) preference to rules δevenings
and δinvitation, talking about where to go, over δtheatre and δnight-club simply indicating where
to go. 12
First of all, it is easy to see that default theory
(D,W)= ({(12)–(17)}, {(18)–(23)}) (24)
has three extension in standard default logic, one containing goto(theatre), one containing
goto(night-club), and one including both.
Clearly, the application of the rules in (14)–(17) is not subject to any preferences, so that
any extension must contain:
ap(nevenings), ap(njane), ap(njim), and ap(ninvitation).
This is different for the rules in (12) and (13), whose application depends on the
context spanned by the encompassing extension. Because of (22) and (23), the rules
δtheatre and δnight-club depend both on the applicability of δevenings and δinvitation. Their
interdependency, however, is subject to the presence of corresponding preference literals,
12 This is because the former influence the latter but not vice versa.
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like ntheatre⊀ nnight-club and ntheatre ≺ nnight-club in the case of δtheatre. This is reflected by
the following two formulas, common to all extension construction processes:
( [ (ntheatre⊀ nnight-club)
∨
(ntheatre ≺ nnight-club ⊃ ap(nnight-club)∨ bl(nnight-club)) ]
∧ [ ap(nevenings)∨ bl(nevenings) ]
∧ [ap(ninvitation)∨ bl(ninvitation) ] )
⊃ ok(ntheatre)
( [ (nnight-club ⊀ ntheatre)
∨
(nnight-club ≺ ntheatre ⊃ ap(ntheatre)∨ bl(ntheatre)) ]
∧ [ ap(nevenings)∨ bl(nevenings) ]
∧ [ap(ninvitation)∨ bl(ninvitation) ] )
⊃ ok(nnight-club)
The imageD((D,W)) of theory (D,W), given in (24), leads to an extension containing
invites(jim, jane) and therefore also ntheatre ≺ nnight-club and ¬(nnight-club ≺ ntheatre). Be-
cause of ap(ninvitation) and ap(nevenings), we then get ok(nnight-club) and (ap(nnight-club) ∨
bl(nnight-club))⊃ ok(ntheatre). As a result, we obtain goto(night-club) and ¬goto(theatre).
When we learn that it happens to be Jim’s birthday, thus adding birthday(jim), we
get an extension containing invites(jane, jim) and therefore also nnight-club ≺ ntheatre and
¬(ntheatre ≺ nnight-club). Analogously, we then obtain goto(theatre) and¬goto(night-club).
Learning furthermore that Jim’s birthday falls on a Saturday makes it a real party-night.
In fact, we conclude from saturday that it’s party-night, which blocks default rule δevenings,
and we end up with an extension containing both goto(theatre) and goto(night-club). Note
that this is concluded in the presence of invites(jane, jim) and nnight-club ≺ ntheatre.
Finally, the news tells us that the theatre is closed, closed(theatre); this blocks default
rule δtheatre and we only conclude goto(night-club), as above, despite the presence of
nnight-club ≺ ntheatre.
Next, we consider an example from [21], discussed in [8]:
“A person wants to find out if her security interest in a certain ship is ‘perfected’,
or legally valid. This person has possession of the ship, but has not filed a financing
statement. According to the code UCC, a security interest can be perfected by taking
possession of the ship. However, the federal Ship Mortgage Act (SMA) states that a
security interest in a ship may only be perfected by filing a financing statement. Both
UCC and SMA are applicable; the question is which takes precedence here. There
are two legal principles for resolving such conflicts. Lex Posterior gives precedence
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to newer laws; here we have that UCC is more recent than SMA. But Lex Superior
gives precedence to laws supported by the higher authority; here SMA has higher
authority since it is federal law.”
Apart from δ>, we obtain the following default rules:
ucc : possession : perfected
perfected , sma :
ship∧¬finstmt : ¬perfected
¬perfected ,
lp(x, y) : newer(y, x) : x ≺ y
x ≺ y , ls(x, y) :
statelaw(x)∧ fedlaw(y) : x ≺ y
x ≺ y .
To preserve finiteness, we restrict our attention to name set N = {n>} ∪ N0 ∪ N1 where
N0 = {ucc, sma} and N1 = {lp(x, y), ls(x, y) | x, y ∈ N0}, and the corresponding default
instances. We have the facts:
possession, ship, ¬finstmt,
newer(ucc, sma), fedlaw(sma), statelaw(ucc),
∀x, y,u, v ∈N0. lp(x, y)≺ ls(u, v).
From this specification, we obtain a single extension, E ⊇ {¬perfected,ucc ≺ sma}. We
obtain ∀xy ∈N0. ok(ls(x, y)). In E we get ok(ls(ucc, sma)) while
bl
(
ls(ucc, sma)
)∨ ap(ls(ucc, sma))⊃ ok(lp(sma,ucc)).
(All other instances of these axioms are eliminated by deriving x ⊀ y .) We then conclude
by ls(ucc, sma) that ucc≺ sma. This blocks lp(sma,ucc) since its justification sma≺ ucc
has become refuted. Thus, sma⊀ ucc ∈E yielding ok(sma) and subsequently ¬perfected.
Brewka [8] solves this problem by first generating 4 entire extensions, where E1 ⊇
{perfected, sma ≺ ucc}, E2 ⊇ {¬perfected, sma ≺ ucc}, E3 ⊇ {perfected,ucc ≺ sma},
E4 ⊇ {¬perfected,ucc≺ sma}. In a second step he rules out E1,E2,E3 since they do not
verify a certain priority criterion. The remaining extension, E4 is after all the one obtained
in our approach.
6. Further extensions
An axiomatic approach to preferences offers a highly flexible framework for specifying
preferences. For instance, a more fine-grained approach is to distinguish the source of
blockage by replacing δb1 and δb2 by
ok(nδ) : ¬α
blp(nδ)
and
¬β ∧ ok(nδ) :
blj (nδ)
, respectively.
Accordingly, we would obtain in W≺ the axiom
∀x ∈N. [∀y ∈N. (x ≺ y)⊃ (blp(y)∨ blj (y)∨ ap(y))]⊃ ok(x).
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We use such an encoding in [12] where we argue that property inheritance comprises a
mechanism distinct from preference. 13
Two different substantive extensions are discussed in the remainder of this section.
6.1. Expressing generalised preferences
An important generalisation of our notion of preference, expressed in Section 3 is the
following.
Generalised Preference. For preferences δ1 < · · ·< δm, apply δm if possible; apply δm−1
if possible, continue in this fashion until no more than k (for fixed k where 1 6 k 6 m)
defaults have been applied.
An example is where a student wishes to take k = 3 courses out of m = 10 possible
courses, and so provides a list of preferences over the courses. There are two important
subcases corresponding to k = 1 and k =m. In the first case a maximum of one default is
applied. In the second case one attempts to apply every default.
Given the predicates bl(·), ap(·), and notably ko(·), it is a straightforward matter to
assert that a maximum of k default rules in a priority order can be applied. We modify
the definition of δa (cf. (5)), by setting
δa = α ∧ ok(nδ) : β ∧¬ko(nδ)
γ ∧ ap(nδ) .
In addition we add the following axiom to the initial set of facts:
∀x1, . . . , xk ∈N.
([ ∧
i 6=j ; i,j=1,...,k
(xi 6= xj )⊃
∧
i=1,...,k
ap(xi)
]
⊃ ∀x ∈N.
[ ∧
i=1,...,k
(x 6= xi)⊃ ko(x)
])
.
We abbreviate ¬(x = y) by x 6= y . This axiom states that if k distinct rules are applied,
then all remaining rules are ko’ed. For coherence, it is furthermore convenient to supply
a statement to the effect that all rules are considered in turn, although some of them have
been “knocked out”. This can be done with ∀x ∈N. ko(x)⊃ bl(x).
For illustration, consider a student who wishes to take three courses, and has a preference
ordering on the ten available courses. So depending on the prerequisites and what courses
are still open (i.e., aren’t fully subscribed) the student’s preferences are satisfied as far as
possible. Taking a variable s for students and another ci for courses, we get:
prerequisite(s, ci) : open(ci)∧¬canceled(ci)
subscribe(s, ci)
.
13 Thus one would encode that it is ok to apply a rule just if all <-greater rules are blocked via failure to prove
the antecedent. We do not develop this mechanism here since it would take us too far from our primary interest,
preference.
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Our student has the following preferences: c5 is her most preferred course; she wants to
avoid c4; she prefers c6 over c2, if c5 isn’t open anymore; and finally she prefers c6 over c3
and c5, unless Smith is giving the course:
ci ≺ c5, i = 1, . . . ,4,6, . . . ,10,
c4 ≺ cj , j = 1, . . . ,3,5, . . . ,10,
¬open(c5)⊃ c6 ≺ c2,
: lecturer(c6) 6= Smith
(c3 ≺ c6)∧ (c7 ≺ c6) .
Assume that our student fulfills the prerequisites for all but course 9 and 10, and that
courses 1, 3, and 8 are already fully subscribed. Fortunately, Smith is on sabbatical.
For k = 3 and C = {ci | i = 1, . . . ,10}, we get
∀x1, x2, x3 ∈C.
( [
(x1 6= x2)∧ (x1 6= x3)∧ (x2 6= x3)⊃ ap(x1)∧ ap(x2)∧ ap(x3)
]
⊃ ∀y ∈C.[(y 6= x1)∧ (y 6= x2)∧ (y 6= x3)⊃ ko(y)] ).
Applying our dynamic translationD along with the above modifications to the correspond-
ing default theory yields, after a few iterations in Definition 2.1, among others:
ok(n5),(
ap(n5)∨ bl(n5)
) ⊃ ok(ni),[(
ap(n6)∨ bl(n6)
)∧ (ap(n5)∨ bl(n5))] ⊃ ok(nj ),[(∧
j∈J
ap(nj )∨ bl(nj )
)
∧
(∧
i∈I
ap(ni)∨ bl(ni)
)
∧ (ap(n5)∨ bl(n5))] ⊃ ok(n4),
for i ∈ I = {1,2,6,8,9,10} and j ∈ J = {3,7}. Taking into account the above constraints,
we get that c5 must be taken first, followed by c2 or c6 or c7 (but c6 before c7) and finally c4.
As a result, we obtain two extensions: one containing c5, c6, and c2 and another one
containing c5, c6, and c7. Neither of them contains c4 nor is there an extension containing
c5, c2, and c7 due to c7 ≺ c6. If c5 turned out to be overbooked, we would get a single
extension containing c2, c6, and c7. If additionally c7 is canceled, we get c2, c6, and c4.
That is, our student is finally obliged to take c4. Otherwise, if it turns out that Smith keeps
lecturing c6 despite his sabbatical, she is faced with three alternatives: c5, c6, c2 or c5, c6,
c7 or c5, c2, c7.
6.2. Preferences among sets of defaults
Preferences also may apply to sets of defaults. Consider for example preferences
in buying a car, specifically a situation in which one ranks the price (E) over safety
features (S), and safety features (S) over power (P ), but safety features together with power
is ranked over price. In an obvious extension of preference to sets of defaults, we can write
this as: 14{ : P
P
}
<
{ : S
S
}
<
{ : E
E
}
<
{ : P
P
,
: S
S
}
. (25)
14 To be sure, this is a naïve encoding; see [6] for a more realistic formalisation.
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Intuitively, if we were given only that not all desiderata can be satisfied (i.e., W =
{¬(P ∧E ∧ S)}) then we could apply the defaults in the highest-ranked set and conclude
that P and S can be met. 15 This approach is described in [11], and a related approach and
implementation in the framework of extended logic programs is described in [13].
We omit the details here, but the overall methodology is the same as for static and
dynamic preferences. In the set-based approach, a default theory now has an ordering given
on sets of defaults. As before, we take an ordered theory and translate it into a standard
default theory. Consider a general assertion D′ < D′′ where D′,D′′ ⊆ D. Informally we
prefer the application of the set D′′ to that of D′. We can say that D′′ is applicable if all its
member defaults are, and inapplicable if one of its members is inapplicable. Consequently
we consider D′ after all defaults in D′′ are found to be applicable, or some default in D′′
is found to be inapplicable.
To do this, we extend our set of names so that, in addition to names for individual default
rules, we also have names for the sets of rules mentioned in the ordering over sets, <.
Roughly speaking, for a set with name m, if it is ok(m) to apply a set of rules then it is ok
to apply the individual rules in the set. If ap(ni) is true for every rule δi in a set, then the
set is flagged as applied by ap(m). If bl(ni) is true for some rule δi in a set, then the set
is so flagged by bl(m). Finally, for a given set, if every <-greater set is applied or blocked
then it is ok to apply the set.
However, there is a problem with “side-effects” in a naïve implementation of this
approach. Assume in the example (25) that P and S cannot be jointly met (i.e., W =
{¬(P ∧ S)}). We would expect that there would be a single extension containing E and S.
In a naïve implementation, one would try to apply the defaults in the highest-ranked set.
On applying the default :P
P
it would prove to be the case that :S
S
could not be applied,
or vice versa. So we would find that the topmost nontrivial set isn’t applicable. However,
in finding that defaults in the highest ranked set cannot all be applied, we do not want to
actually apply the default :P
P
, since this will lead to an incorrect result: if the instance of
:P
P
in this set were applied, then we would next try to apply the default in the next set
(viz. :E
E
), which would be successful, but then, given P , we couldn’t apply the default
in the following set, viz. :S
S
. We would then (incorrectly) obtain an extension containing
{P,E}. So in determining that the defaults in a set cannot all be applied, we must avoid
the side-effect where some of these defaults are in fact applied. We do this by detecting
when a set of defaults is going to be blocked. This will occur just when the negation
of a prerequisite is consistent (with the final extension), or if the set of consequents
denies the justification of a default in a set. In either of these cases, the set as a whole
is blocked, and there are no side effects that propagate to lower ranked sets. Consult [11]
for details.
15 Note that we cannot simply replace a set of defaults with a default consisting of the conjunction of the
respective prerequisites, justifications, and consequents of defaults in the set, since this doesn’t allow for rule
interactions. For example by this scheme the set { :P
P
, P :S
S
} would be replaced by the meaningless default
P :P∧S
P∧S .
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7. Related work
In Section 3 we argued that there is no single notion for treating prioritised information.
Of work in default logic, we have argued that Reiter and Criscuolo [31], Etherington and
Reiter [17] and Delgrande and Schaub [10] address property inheritance (as exemplified
by example (3)). In particular, these approaches are based on the idea of resolving conflicts
by appeal to specificity information. Hence, for non-conflicting rules they may produce
inappropriate results when used for preferences. For instance, take A :B
B
< C :D
D
along with
A,C,¬D. While one expects a single extension containing B , the aforecited approaches
would replace the first rule either by A :B∧¬C
B
or A :B∧(C⊃D)
B
, respectively, neither of which
would be applicable for providing B .
For preference, there are descriptive and prescriptive interpretations. In the former case,
one has a “wish list” where the intent is that one way or another the highest-ranked defaults
be applied. In the latter case the ordering reflects the order in which defaults should be
applied.
Rintanen [33] addresses descriptive preference orders in normal default theories (this
despite the paper’s title and examples, which would indicate that the paper deals with
property inheritance). An order on extensions is defined as follows. A default rule A :B
B
is
applied in extensionE just if A,B ∈E. Extension E is preferred over E′ iff there is δ ∈D
applied in E but not in E′ such that if δ′ is preferred over δ and δ′ is applied in E′ then
it is also applied in E. While this paper addresses a different notion of preference than
ours, it is worth noting two sources of “inefficiency” in Rintanen’s approach not present
in ours. First, preference on extensions is given in terms of a total order on preferences
among rules; consequently, given a partial order on rules, all total orders that preserve the
original partial order must be generated. Second, all extensions are generated, and then
the preferred extension is found via the “filtering” mechanism. Consider an ordered theory
where we just have the preference :B(x)
B(x)
<
:A(x)
A(x)
along with ∀x(¬A(x)∨¬B(x)). Clearly
the number of total orders resulting from this partial order will be exponential in the number
of instances of A and B . Similarly the number of extensions in the unordered theory will
be exponential in the number of instances. In contrast, in our approach a single extension
is produced, in a translated theory that is only a constant factor larger than the original.
For prescriptive approaches, Baader and Hollunder [1] and Brewka [7] present
prioritised variants of default logic in which the iterative specification of an extension
is modified. A default is only applicable at an iteration step (cf. Definition 2.1) if no
<-greater default is applicable. 16 The primary difference between these approaches rests
on the number of defaults applicable at each step. While Brewka allows only for applying a
single default that is maximal with respect to a total extension of <, Baader and Hollunder
allow for applying all <-maximal defaults at each step. In contrast we translate priorities
into standard default theories.
As a first distinguishing example, consider the normal default rules
δ1 : : A
A
, δ2 : : B
B
, δ3 : B : C
C
, δ4 : A : ¬C¬C
16 These authors use < in the reverse order from us.
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along with δ4 < δ3, taken from [2]. With no facts Baader and Hollunder obtain
one extension containing {A,B,C}. Curiously, Brewka obtains an additional extension
containing {A,B,¬C}. In our approach, the resultant default theory yields only the first
extension containing {A,B,C}. So here our approach yields the same result as Baader and
Hollunder’s.
As a second example, again from [2], consider the rules
δ1 : : A
A
, δ2 : B : ¬A¬A , δ3 :
: B
B
, δ4 : A : ¬B¬B
along with δ1 < δ2, δ3 < δ4. Baader and Hollunder show that in Brewka’s approach
two extensions are obtained, one containing {A,¬B} and another containing {¬A,B}.
However an additional extension is obtained in Baader and Hollunder’s approach,
containing {A,B}. Our approach yields only the first two extensions. So, as opposed to
the previous example, our approach yields here the same result as Brewka’s approach. In
all, we observe that in both examples our approach yields the fewer and arguably more
intuitive extensions.
Neither Brewka nor Baader and Hollunder deal with context-sensitive preferences or
sets of preferences. In addition, in our approach we translate preferences into standard
default theories. Junker [23] addresses static and dynamic preferences in a more restricted
framework that roughly corresponds to ordered prerequisite-free normal default theories.
In a preliminary report, Brewka and Gordon [6] consider sets of preferences, but not in
default logic.
Brewka and Eiter [4] address (static) preference in extended logic programs; this is
extended to default logic in [5]. In common with previous work, Brewka and Eiter begin
with a partial order on a rule base, but define preference with respect to total orders that
conform to the original partial order. As well, answer sets or extensions, respectively, are
first generated and the “preferred” answer sets (extensions) are selected subsequently. In
contrast, in our approach, we deal only with the original partial order, which is translated
into the object theory. As well, only “preferred” extensions are produced in our approach;
there is no need for meta-level filtering of extensions.
We have the following result relating the approach of [5] with the instance of our
framework captured by translation T :
Theorem 7.1. Let (D,W,<) be a normal, prerequisite-free, ordered default theory
over L.
For each extension E of T ((D,W,<)), there is an extension E′ of (D,W,<) according
to [5] such that E =E′ ∩L and vice versa.
To see that this result does not extend to prerequisite-free theories, consider({
n1 : : B
B
,n2 : : A
A
,n3 : : ¬B
A
}
,∅, {δi < δj | i < j }
)
. (26)
This theory has a single regular extension, containing A and B . Observe that the theory
obtained by applying translation T yields no preferred extension due to the interaction
among blockage and preference, described in Section 4.2. This differs from the approach
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of Brewka and Eiter in [5], who accept the above extension as a preferred one. 17 This
is done by imposing an additional fixed-point condition: Given an ordered default theory
(D,W,<) and a regular extension E, the preferredness of E is established with respect to
the theory(
D \ {δ | Conseq(δ) ∈E and ¬Justif (δ) ∈E},W,< ).
This turns theory (26) into ({n1 : :BB ,n2 : :AA },∅, {δ1 < δ2}), whose only preferred
extension contains A and B (see Theorem 7.1).
Theorem 7.1 does not extend to normal default theories, either. Observe that (6) yields a
preferred extension, Th({A,B}), in the approach of Brewka and Eiter, while ours does
not due to the interaction among groundedness and preference. Such an interaction is
avoided in [5] by another fixed-point construction eliminating prerequisites that belong
to the extension and eliminating rules whose prerequisites do not belong to the extension.
In all, our initial approach captured by T can be seen as refining the set of extensions
obtained in [5]:
Theorem 7.2. Let (D,W,<) be an ordered default theory over L.
For each extension E′ of T ((D,W,<)) there is a preferred extension E of (D,W,<)
according to [5] such that E =E′ ∩L.
To see that such a refinement makes sense, consider the following example due to Baader
and Hollunder [1]:({
n1 : Penguin : ¬Fly¬Fly , n2 :
Bird : Winged
Winged
, n3 : Winged : FlyFly ,
n4 : Penguin : BirdBird
}
, {Penguin}, {δ2 < δ1}
)
.
While this theory has a single extension in our approach, containing ¬Fly, Bird, and
Winged, the approach of Brewka and Eiter yields an additional extension with Fly.
The above discussion was dominated by the comparison between our specific transla-
tion T and the approach of Brewka and Eiter. In fact, our overall framework is general
enough to express the strategy for preference handling proposed in [5]. This instance of
our framework is described in [14] and is omitted here for brevity. Lastly we note that
Brewka and Eiter begin with two “principles” that in their view provide meaning postu-
lates for the term “preference”, and so should be satisfied by any approach dealing with
preference. We show in [13] that our approach also satisfies both principles. 18,19
Among the various approaches to preferences in (extended) logic programming, a
central role is played by the approach in [20] because unlike others it avoids defining a new
17 We note that theory (8), used to illustrate the interaction between preferences and blockage relations, yields
also no preferred extension in the approach of Brewka and Eiter [5].
18 To be precise, we do this in the framework of extended logic programming. The underlying proofs lift to
default logic in a straightforward way.
19 Brewka and Eiter [4] claim, erroneously, that the present approach violates their Principle I, based on their
claim that we have extension Th({A,¬B}) for example (4). However our approach in this case has no extension;
see the discussion preceding Theorem 4.5.
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nonmonotonic formalism in order to cope with preference information. Instead, Gelfond
and Son introduce a special-purpose language for directly encoding preferences in a logic
programming setting. 20 As with our framework, this approach offers a variety of different
preference handling instances. Unlike us, however, Gelfond and Son pursue a “two-level”
approach in reifying rules and preferences. For example, a rule like r∧¬s :¬q
p
, or p←
r,¬s,not q in terms of logic programming, is expressed by the formula (or after reification
by the corresponding term inside a holds-predicate, respectively) default(n,p, [r,¬s], [q])
where n is the name of the rule. The semantics of a domain description is defined in terms
of a set of domain-independent rules for predicates like holds. These rules can be regarded
as a meta-interpreter for the domain description. Interestingly, the approach is based on
the notion of “defeat” (of justifications) in contrast to an order-preserving consideration of
rules, as found in our approach. Also, the specific strategy elaborated upon in [20] differs
from the ones considered in this paper in that it “stops the application of default d2 if
defaults d1 and d2 are in conflict with each other and the default d1 is applicable” [20].
(We consider such strategies in a companion paper [12].) For detecting such conflicts,
however, the approach necessities an extra conflict-indicating predicate. That is, one must
state explicitly conflict(d1, d2) to indicate that d1 and d2 conflict.
8. Discussion
We have described a very general framework for incorporating preferences into default
logic. Via the naming of defaults we allow preferences to appear arbitrarily in D and W
in a default theory. This allows preferences among preferences, preferences by default,
preferences holding only in certain contexts, and so on. Given that such preferences are
axiomatised using standard default logic, this approach may be regarded as providing a
formalisation of a notion of “preference”. The intuition on which the approach is based
is clear: that a preference order specifies the order in which defaults are to be taken into
account to see whether they are applicable. We argue that such a prescriptive approach is
preferable to a descriptive approach, both from the point of view of representational force,
as well as (pragmatic) computational considerations.
In the base approach, we are given a standard Reiter default theory together with a strict
partial order on the defaults. We also allow preference information to be expressed within
a default theory, so that preference information can appear in the world knowledge W or
in the defaults D. In [11] we show how preferences on sets of defaults can be similarly
handled. In all cases we translate the default theory into second, standard default theory
without explicit preferences, but in which defaults are applied according to the given
ordering. Notably in all cases the translated theory is larger than the original by only a
constant factor.
We prove that the defaults are indeed applied in the appropriate order. As well, we show
that we have developed a set of strict generalisations in each of the elaborations to the basic
approach, in that in a preference-based theory with no preferences, the translated theory
20 The chosen setting, viz. answer set semantics, corresponds to default logic on the fragment of extended logic
programs [19].
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(modulo the language) gives the same result as in classical default logic. In addition to
the formal results, we illustrate the generality of the approach by formalising examples
due to Junker and Gordon, of context-based preference, canceling preferences, preferences
among preferences, and preferences by default. As well, elsewhere we show that we can
capture the approach of Brewka and Eiter [5].
It might be argued that, given complete information about preferences, such generality
may not be required: Doyle and Wellman [15], building on work by Arrow, argue that in
any preference-based default theory, for coherence, one requires a “dictator” to adjudicate
preferences. That is, in a complete system there must be, essentially, some way of
determining a unique, complete, priority ordering. So in this sense, all one needs is what
we have called the rigid approach of Section 4. We provide the more general framework
of Section 5 for several reasons. First, in most realistic scenarios, one may not have
complete information regarding preferences, and so a complete adjudication of preferences
may not be possible. In this case one would obtain multiple extensions, representing
possible “completions” of an incomplete ordering. Second, it allows the more flexible
specification of preferences, leaving it up to the user to ensure that there is no ambiguity
in preferences. This is well illustrated by Gordon’s legal example (see below also) where a
natural expression of interacting types of laws uses preferences among preferences.
Our approach of translating priorities into standard default theories has several
advantages over previous work, which is phrased at the meta-level or alters the machinery
of standard default logic. First, for a translated default theory, in our approach any
extension is “preferred”, in the sense that only “preferred” extensions (as specified by the
ordering on rules) are produced. In contrast, previous approaches, in one fashion or another,
must select among extensions for the most preferred. Hence one could expect the present
approach to be (pragmatically) more efficient, since it avoids the generation of unnecessary
extensions.
Another advantage of this axiomatic approach is that it allows us to formalise preference
within the object theory. In particular this allows one to combine several orderings inside
the same framework, and to specify in the theory how they interact. For instance, in
legal reasoning different principles prefer different laws. We saw how Lex Posterior gives
precedence to newer laws, while Lex Superior gives precedence to laws supported by
the higher authority and finally Lex Specialis gives precedence to more specific laws.
For reasoning with and about such principles, an explicit representation seems to be
advantageous. For instance, we can state that Lex Specialis applies unless Lex Posterior
or Lex Superior denies the precedence:
(x ≺specialis y) : ¬(y ≺posterior x),¬(y ≺superior x)
x ≺ y .
Also, generally, authority takes precedence over time. However, here too there may be
exceptions, so that we must account for this by a default rule:
(x ≺superior y)∧ (y ≺posterior x) : x ≺ y
x ≺ y .
The axiomatic approach makes it easier to compare differing approaches to handling
different preference orderings or types of orderings, since we remain within the same
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“base” framework. That is, default logic provides a powerful tool with which to express
such orderings. As a result also, our approach can be immediately implemented by making
use of existing default logic theorem provers, since a preference based theory can be
translated in a straightforward and efficient way into default logic. Lastly, by “compiling”
preferences into default logic, and in using the standard machinery of default logic, we
obtain insight into the notion of preference orderings. Thus, and as a point of theoretical
interest, we show that incorporating explicit priorities among sets of rules in default logic
in fact provides no real increase in the expressibility of default logic.
Lastly, our approach has been implemented under the syntactic restriction of extended
logic programming and serves as a front-end to the logic programming systems dlv [16]
and smodels [27]. The current prototype is available at
http://www.cs.uni-potsdam.de/˜torsten/plp/.
This URL also contains examples taken from the literature, including those discussed in
this paper. Both the dynamic approach to (single) preferences and a set-based approach
have been implemented. Details on this implementation can be found in [13].
Appendix A. Proofs of theorems
The following definition is drawn upon in the following proofs.
Definition A.1. Let (D,W) be a default theory. For any set of formulas S, let Γ (S) be the
smallest set of formulas S′ such that
(1) W ⊆ S′,
(2) Th(S′)= S′,
(3) For any α :β
γ
∈D, if α ∈ S′ and ¬β /∈ S then γ ∈ S′.
A set of formulas E is an extension of (D,W) if Γ (E)=E.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
(1) By consistency of E, we cannot have both nδ ≺ nδ′ ∈ E and ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈ E.
Assume that for some δ, δ′ ∈ D, we have neither nδ ≺ nδ′ ∈ E nor ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈ E.
Then, however, the default rule :¬(nδ≺nδ′ )¬(nδ≺nδ′ ) in D≺ is applicable and we obtain ¬(nδ ≺
nδ′) ∈ E, which contradicts our assumption. We have thus shown that nδ ≺ nδ′ ∈ E iff
¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈E.
For further proofs, we observe moreover the following complementary proposition.
Lemma A.1. Let E be a consistent extension of T ((D,W,<)) = (D′,W ′) for ordered
default theory (D,W,<). We have for all δ, δ′ ∈D that (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈E iff (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈W ′.
Proof. Clearly, we have (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈E if (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈W ′.
Assume we have (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈ E and (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ W ′. Since (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ W ′ = E0,
there must exist (according to Definition 2.1) some i > 0 with (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ Ei but
(nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈ Ei+1. Since there are no default rules with consequents containing positive
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occurrences of ≺-literals, we must have (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈ Th(Ei). Due to the same reason, all
positive occurrences in Ei must stem from W≺. In fact, all positive occurrences of ≺-
literals in W≺ are connected disjunctively with a positive ok-literal. That is, they are of the
form ((nδ ≺ nδ′) ∧ φ) ∨ ϕ ∨ ok(nδ) for some formulas φ,ϕ. A proof for Ei ` (nδ ≺ nδ′)
must thus contain the negative ok-literal ok(nδ). There are however no negative occurrences
of ok-literals in T ((D,W,<)), neither in D′ nor in W ′, a contraction. 2
(2) + (3) We show by induction on < that ok(nδ) ∈ E and either ap(nδ) ∈ E or
bl(nδ) ∈E for all δ ∈D.
Base. By definition, ok(n>) ∈ W≺ ⊆ E. Also, ⊥ /∈ E, since E is consistent. This
implies that >∧ok(n>) :>>∧ap(n>) ∈GD(D′,E) along with
ok(n>)∧⊥ :
bl(n>) /∈GD(D′,E) and
ok(n>) :⊥
bl(n>) /∈
GD(D′,E). That is, ap(n>) ∈E and bl(n>) /∈E.
Step. Consider δ and assume that for all δ′ with δ < δ′ we have ok(nδ′) ∈ E and either
ap(nδ′) ∈E or bl(nδ′) ∈E.
First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. Given the induction hypothesis, we have ok(nδ) ∈E.
Proof. By the induction hypothesis, we have either ap(nδ′) ∈ E or bl(nδ′) ∈ E for all δ′
with δ < δ′.
By definition of W≺ and Lemma A.1, we have nδ ≺ nδ′ ∈E for all δ, δ′ with δ < δ′.
Analogously, we get (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈E for all δ, δ′ with δ 6< δ′. From this, we get by means
of D≺ that ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈E for all δ, δ′ with δ < δ′.
Because E is deductively closed and contains
∀x ∈N. [∀y ∈N. (x ≺ y)⊃ (bl(y)∨ ap(y))]⊃ ok(x),
we therefore deduce that ok(nδ) ∈E. 2
Consider n : α :β
γ
∈D. We distinguish the following two cases.
–
α∧ok(n) :β
γ∧ap(n) ∈GD(D′,E). Consequently, we have ok(n),ap(n) ∈E.
–
α∧ok(n) :β
γ∧ap(n) /∈GD(D′,E). Then, we have one of the following cases.• α ∧ ok(n) /∈ E. By Lemma A.2 and the fact that E is deductively closed, we
get α /∈ E. Again, by Lemma A.2, this implies ok(n) :¬αbl(n) ∈ GD(D′,E). That is,
bl(n) ∈E.
• ¬β ∈E. By Lemma A.2, this implies ¬β∧ok(n) :bl(n) ∈GD(D′,E). That is, bl(n) ∈E.
This demonstrates that either ap(nδ) ∈E or bl(nδ) ∈E for all δ ∈D. That is, ap(nδ) ∈E
iff bl(nδ) /∈E.
(4) Given ok(nδ) ∈ Ei and Prereq(δ) ∈ Ej , we get ok(nδ) ∧ Prereq(δ) ∈ Emax(i,j)+1.
With ¬Justif (δ) /∈ E, this implies δa ∈ GDmax(i,j)+1, and furthermore Conseq(δ) ∧
ap(nδ) ∈Emax(i,j)+2. Hence, ap(nδ) ∈Emax(i,j)+3.
(5) Given ok(nδ) ∈ Ei and Prereq(δ) /∈ E, we get δb1 ∈GDi , and furthermore bl(nδ) ∈
Ei+1.
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(6) We have ok(nδ) ∈ Ei and ¬Justif (δ) ∈ E. Assume ¬Justif (δ) ∈ Ek for some min-
imal k. Then, we get ok(nδ) ∧ ¬Justif (δ) ∈ Emax(i,k)+1. This implies δb2 ∈GDmax(i,k)+1,
and furthermore bl(nδ) ∈Emax(i,k)+2. That is, bl(nδ) ∈Ej for some j > i + 1.
(7) Let ok(nδ) /∈Ei−1 and ok(nδ) ∈Ei . We distinguish two cases.
– ap(nδ) ∈E. Consequently, Prereq(δ)∧ ok(nδ) ∈E and ¬Justif (δ) /∈E. Assume that
Prereq(δ) ∈ Ej for some j < i (otherwise the claim follows trivially). We then have
Prereq(δ)∧ok(nδ) ∈Ei , implying that δa ∈GDi . Hence, Conseq(δ)∧ap(nδ) ∈Ei+1
and ap(nδ) ∈Ei+2. Accordingly, ap(nδ) /∈Ek for k < i + 2.
– bl(nδ) ∈E. We may distinguish the following cases.
• Prereq(δ) /∈ E. This along with ok(nδ) ∈ Ei implies that δb1 ∈ GDi . Hence,
bl(nδ) ∈Ei+1 but bl(nδ) /∈Ek for k < i + 1.
• ¬Justif (δ) ∈ E. Assume that ¬Justif (δ) ∈ Ej for some j < i . We then have
¬Justif (δ)∧ok(nδ) ∈Ei , implying that δb2 ∈GDi . Hence, bl(nδ) ∈Ei but bl(nδ) /∈
Ek for k < i .
Considering both last cases, we obtain that bl(nδ) /∈Ek for k < i . 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
(8) This is a corollary to Theorem 4.1(3).
(9) We have δ < δ′ and δ′a, δ′b1, δ′b2 /∈ GDi for some δ, δ′ ∈ D. Assume that one of
δ′a ∈ GDi+1 or δ′b1 ∈GDi+1 or δ′b2 ∈GDi+1 holds for all δ′ with δ < δ′. Thus, we have
bl(nδ′) ∈Ei+2 or Conseq(δ′)∧ ap(nδ′) ∈Ei+2—and subsequently ap(nδ′) ∈Ei+3—for all
such δ′.
Consider Ei+2. By definition of W≺, we have nδ ≺ nδ′ ∈ Ei+2 for all δ, δ′ with δ < δ′
and by applying the argument of Lemma A.1, we obtain ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈ Ei+2 for all δ, δ′
with δ 6< δ′. Also, we have(∀x ∈N. [∀y ∈N. (x ≺ y)⊃ (bl(y)∨ ap(y))]⊃ ok(x)) ∈Ei+2.
Because Ei+3 contains the deductive closure of Ei+2, we deduce that ok(nδ) ∈ Ei+3 but
ok(nδ) /∈Ej for j < i + 3. We thus have δa, δb1, δb2 /∈GDj for j < i + 3.
(10) Assume we have δ′a ∈ GDi or δ′b1 ∈GDi or δ′b2 ∈GDi for all δ′ with δ < δ′ but
δ′a /∈ GDi−1 and δ′b1 /∈GDi−1 and δ′b2 /∈GDi−1 for some such δ′. We then get either
bl(nδ′) ∈ Ei+1 or Conseq(δ′) ∧ ap(nδ′) ∈ Ei+1—and subsequently ap(nδ′) ∈ Ei+2—for
all such δ′.
By the reasoning employed in (9), this implies one of the following: δb1 ∈ GDi+2 or
δa ∈GDi+3 or δb2 ∈GDi+3. In all, we thus have δa ∈GDj or δb1 ∈GDj or δb2 ∈GDj for
some j > i + 2.
(11) Assume we have δa ∈ GDi or δb1 ∈GDi or δb2 ∈GDi for all δ with δ < δ′ but
δa /∈GDi−1 and δb1 /∈GDi−1 and δb2 /∈GDi−1 for some such δ.
By reasoning backwards along the lines of (9), we get that either ok(nδ) ∈ Ei−1 or
ok(nδ) ∈Ei−2. Assume ok(nδ) ∈Ei−1. Continuing reasoning backwards in this way yields
bl(nδ′) ∈Ei−2 or ap(nδ′) ∈Ei−2 for all δ′ with δ < δ′.
– If bl(nδ′) ∈Ei−2, we have either δb1 ∈GDi−3 or δb2 ∈GDi−3.
– If ap(nδ′) ∈Ei−2, then Conseq(δ′)∧ ap(nδ′) ∈Ei−3, that is, δa ∈GDi−4.
In all, we thus have δ′a ∈GDj or δ′b1 ∈GDj or δ′b2 ∈GDj for some j < i − 2. 2
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Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let E be a consistent extension of T ((D,W,<))= (D′,W ′).
Assume there is an enumeration of 〈δi〉i∈I ofGD(D′,E) and some δ, δ′ ∈D with δ < δ′
such that i < j for some δi = δt and all δj = (δ′)t ′ with t, t ′ ∈ {a, b1, b2}. (Note that
δi, δj ∈D′.)
Since 〈δi〉i∈I is grounded, we have that W ′ ∪ Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) ` Prereq(δi),
which implies that W ′ ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1})` ok(nδ).
Without loss of generality, assume that we have for all δ′′ ∈ D with δ′′ 6= δ′ and
δ′′ 6= δ that either δ 6< δ′′, and so ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′′ ) ∈ E by Lemma A.1, or if δ < δ′′, that is
(nδ ≺ nδ′′) ∈ E by Lemma A.1, then W ′ ∪ Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) ` ap(nδ′′) ∨ bl(nδ′′).
That is, we suppose that δ′ is at i the only default preferred to δ whose application has not
yet been settled. By means of Lemma A.1, we also have (nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈E since δ < δ′.
Now, by definition of T ((D,W,<)), literal ok(nδ) is only derivable by means of
∀x ∈N. [∀y ∈N. (x ≺ y)⊃ (bl(y)∨ ap(y))]⊃ ok(x).
By what we have just supposed, this is reducible at i to
W ′ ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) `
(
ap(nδ′)∨ bl(nδ′)
)⊃ ok(nδ).
However, we have that W ′ ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) 6` ap(nδ′)∨ bl(nδ′), since j > i for all
δj = (δ′)t ′ with t ′ ∈ {a, b1, b2} (and the fact that E is consistent), a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Let (D,W) be a default theory and let <⊆D ×D be some strict
partial order on the default rules.
(if-part) Let E′ be an extension of (D′,W ′)= T ((D,W,<)).
Define
E = Th(W ∪ {Conseq(δ) | δ′a ∈GD(D′,E′)}).
Obviously, we have E =E′ ∩L and for all ϕ ∈ L that ϕ ∈E iff ϕ ∈E′. We show first that
E is an extension of (D,W) and second that E is<-preserving.
By construction of E, we have the following.
(1) W ⊆E,
(2) E = Th(E).
To see that also
(3) For any δ ∈D, if Prereq(δ) ∈E and ¬Justif (δ) /∈E then Conseq(δ) ∈E.
is true, assume Prereq(δ) ∈ E and ¬Justif (δ) /∈E. We then also have Prereq(δ) ∈ E′ and
¬Justif (δ) /∈ E′. Since also ok(nδ) ∈ E′ by Theorem 4.1(2), we obtain δ′a ∈GD(D′,E′),
which implies Conseq(δ) ∈ E by definition of E. According to Definition A.1, we have
Γ (E)⊆E by minimality of Γ (E).
To show the reversal, assume that E 6⊆ Γ (E). Since W ⊆ Γ (E) and both E and
Γ (E) are deductively closed, there must be some δ ∈ D such that Conseq(δ) ∈ E but
Conseq(δ) /∈ Γ (E). By definition of E, Conseq(δ) ∈ E implies δ′a ∈GD(D′,E′). Hence,
¬Justif (δ) /∈ E′, which is equivalent to ¬Justif (δ) /∈ E. An induction on the grounded
enumeration of GD(D′,E′) shows that δ′a ∈ GD(D′,E′) implies Prereq(δ) ∈ Γ (E).
According to Definition A.1, we thus have Conseq(δ) ∈ Γ (E), a contradiction.
We have therefore shown that E is an extension of (D,W).
Finally, we must show that E preserves <:
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Since E′ is an extension of (D′,W ′), there is a grounded enumeration 〈δ′k〉k∈K of
GD(D′,E′). Let 〈δi〉i∈I be the enumeration obtained from 〈δ′k〉k∈K by removing all default
rules of form δb1 and δb2 and by replacing all default rules of form δa by their original rules
δ ∈D. We note thatE = Th(W ∪ {Conseq(δi) | i ∈ I }), since {δ | δa ∈GD(D′,E′)} = {δi |
i ∈ I }. Furthermore, {δi | i ∈ I } equals GD(D,E).
Consider δi for some i ∈ I along with some δ ∈ D such that δi < δ. According to
Definition 4.2, we distinguish the following two cases.
• If δ ∈GD(D,E), then δ = δj for some j ∈ I .
Moreover, there are ki, kj ∈ K such that δ′ki = (δi)a and δ′kj = (δj )a . Since δi < δj ,
we get by Theorem 4.1(11), that kj < ki .
By construction of 〈δi〉i∈I , this implies j < i .
• If δ /∈ GD(D,E), then we also have δa /∈ GD(D′,E′). By Theorem 4.1(8), this
implies that δb1 ∈GD(D′,E′) or δb2 ∈GD(D′,E′):
– If δb1 ∈ GD(D′,E′), then ¬Justif (δ) ∈ E′. This is however equivalent to¬Justif (δ) ∈E.
– If δb2 ∈GD(D′,E′), then Prereq(δ) /∈E′.
More precisely, let δb2 = δ′k for some k ∈K . Then, we have
W ∪ {Conseq(δ′l) | l < k} ` ¬Prereq(δ).
With δ′ki = (δi)a , Theorem 4.1(10), implies moreover that k < ki . By construction
of 〈δi〉i∈I , we thus obtain W ∪ {Conseq(δl) | l < i} ` ¬Prereq(δ).
(only-if-part) Let E be a <-preserving extension of (D,W). That is, there exists
a grounded enumeration 〈δi〉i∈I of GD(D,E) satisfying conditions (1) and (2) in
Definition 4.2.
Define
E′ = Th(E ∪W≺ ∪ {DCAN,UNAN } ∪EL),
where W≺ is as defined in Definition 4.1 and
EL = {ok(nδ) | δ ∈D} ∪ {ap(nδ) | δ ∈GD(D,E)} ∪ {bl(nδ) | δ /∈GD(D,E)}
∪ {¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) | (δ, δ′) /∈< }.
Clearly, we have E = E′ ∩ L and for all ϕ ∈ L that ϕ ∈ E iff ϕ ∈ E′. We show that E′ is
an extension of (D′,W ′)= T ((D,W,<)).
For this, define E′0 =W ′ and otherwise let E′i and GD′i be defined as in Definition 2.1
but here with respect to E′.
(“⊆”-part) We first show that E′ ⊆⋃∞i=0E′i . To begin with, we note that
W ∪W≺ ∪ {DCAN,UNAN } ⊆E′0 ⊆
∞⋃
i=0
E′i (A.1)
by definition of T ((D,W,<)).
By definition of E′, we have :¬(nδ≺nδ′ )¬(nδ≺nδ′ ) ∈GD
′
0 whenever (δ, δ
′) /∈<, which implies
{¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) | (δ, δ′) /∈<} ⊆E′1 ⊆
∞⋃
i=0
E′i . (A.2)
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In what follows, we show the following inclusions.
{ok(nδ) | δ ∈D} ⊆
∞⋃
i=0
E′i , (A.3)
{Conseq(δ),ap(nδ) | δ ∈GD(D,E)} ⊆
∞⋃
i=0
E′i , (A.4)
{bl(nδ) | δ /∈GD(D,E)} ⊆
∞⋃
i=0
E′i . (A.5)
First, we draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the individual membership of the
aforementioned sets in
⋃∞
i=0E′i implies also that their deductive closure, given by E′, is in⋃∞
i=0E′i , since
⋃∞
i=0E′i is a deductively closed set.
For proving inclusions (A.3) to (A.5), we define from the grounded enumeration 〈δi〉i∈I
of GD(D,E), the enumeration 〈δi,j 〉i∈I,j∈J , where δi,0 = δi and for j > 0, we let
δi,j denote the default rules, say δ, in D \ GD(D,E) for which either Prereq(δ) /∈ E
or W ∪ Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) ` ¬Justif (δ). The enumeration, or better its underlying
lexicographic order on I × J , is subject to the following constraint:
If δi,j < δk,l , then k, l < i, j , that is, k < i or k = i and l < j ,
stipulating compatibility with < ⊆ D × D. This is a feasible condition because (i) it is
true for all δ ∈ GD(D,E), and (ii) all default rules in D \ GD(D,E) can be arranged
accordingly. Also, note that the enumeration encompasses all default rules in D, that is,
D = {δi,j | i ∈ I, j ∈ J }.
In concrete terms, we show by induction on the lexicographic order induced by I × J
that
(1) ok(nδ) ∈⋃∞i=0E′i for all δ ∈D,
(2) δa ∈⋃∞i=0E′iGDi or δb1 ∈⋃∞i=0E′iGDi or δb2 ∈⋃∞i=0E′iGDi for all δ ∈D.
The latter is clearly equivalent to proving inclusions (A.4) and (A.5).
Base. By definition, we have δ0,0 = δ>. Also, by definition, ok(n>) ∈ E0. Clearly, we
have δ> ∈ GD1. The argument for default rules of form δ0,j is analogous to that given
below.
Step. Consider δi,j and assume that (1) and (2) hold for all δi′,j ′ with i ′, j ′ < i, j .
We first show the following lemma:
Lemma A.3. Given the induction hypothesis, we have ok(ni,j ) ∈⋃∞i=0E′i .
Proof. By the induction hypothesis, we have either ap(nδi′,j ′ ) ∈
⋃∞
i=0E′i or bl(nδi′,j ′ ) ∈⋃∞
i=0E′i for all δi′,j ′ with i ′, j ′ < i, j . By construction, this implies that either ap(nδi′ ,j ′ ) ∈⋃∞
i=0E′i or bl(nδi′ ,j ′ ) ∈
⋃∞
i=0E′i for all δi,j with δi,j < δi′,j ′ .
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By definition of W≺ and the fact that W≺ ⊆E′0, we have nδ ≺ nδ′ ∈
⋃∞
i=0E′i for all δ, δ′
with δ < δ′. Together with (A.2) and the fact that(∀x ∈N. [∀y ∈N. (x ≺ y)⊃ (bl(y)∨ ap(y))]⊃ ok(x)) ∈ ∞⋃
i=0
E′i ,
we deduce that ok(nδ) ∈⋃∞i=0E′i , because ⋃∞i=0E′i is deductively closed. 2
For δi,j ∈D, we distinguish the following two cases.
(1) j = 0. Consider δi,0 ∈GD(D,E). Since 〈δi〉i∈I is grounded, we have W ∪ conseq
({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) ` Prereq(δi,0). By the induction hypothesis, assuring that {(δ0)a, . . . ,
(δi−1)a} ⊆⋃∞i=0GD′i holds, we get that Prereq(δi,0) ∈E′j ′ for some j ′ > i . In addition, we
have ok(ni) ∈E′j ′′ for some j ′′ > i , by Lemma A.3. Therefore, Prereq(δi,0)∧ ok(ni) ∈E′j
for some j > i .
Also, δi,0 ∈ GD(D,E) implies that ¬Justif (δi,0) /∈ E, which is equivalent to
¬Justif (δi,0) /∈E′ by definition of E′.
As a consequence, we obtain that (δi,0)a ∈GD′j , that is, (δi,0)a ∈
⋃∞
i=0GD′i .
(2) j 6= 0. Otherwise, we have δi,j /∈ GD(D,E), which makes us distinguish the
following cases:
• If Prereq(δi,j ) /∈ E, then Prereq(δi,j ) /∈ E′ by definition of E′. By Lemma A.3, we
get ok(ni,j ) ∈E′m for some m; hence (δi,j )b1 ∈GD′m. That is, (δi,j )b1 ∈
⋃∞
i=0E′i .• IfW ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) `¬Justif (δi,j ), then the induction hypothesis, assuring
that {(δ0)a, . . . , (δi−1)a} ⊆ ⋃∞i=0GD′i holds, implies that ¬Justif (δi,j ) ∈ E′p for
some p. In addition, we get by the induction hypothesis that ok(ni,j ) ∈ E′m
holds for some m. Hence ¬Justif (δi,j ) ∧ ok(ni,j ) ∈ E′max(p,m)+1; whence (δi,j )b2 ∈
GD′max(p,m)+1. That is, (δi,j )b2 ∈
⋃∞
i=0E′i .
(“⊇”-part) Next, we show that ⋃∞i=0E′i ⊆ E′. That is, we prove by induction that
E′i ⊆E′ for all i .
Base. We have E′0 =W ∪W≺ ∪ {DCAN,UNAN } ⊆E′ by definition of E′.
Step. Assume E′i ⊆E′ and consider v ∈E′i+1.• If v ∈ Th(E′i ), we also get v ∈ E′i+1 by the induction hypothesis and the fact that E′
is deductively closed.
• If v ∈ {Conseq(δ′) | δ′ ∈GD′i}, then we must distinguish the following cases:
– If δ′ = :¬(n≺m)¬(n≺m) , then (n≺m) /∈E′. By definition of E′, we then have ¬(n≺m) ∈
E′; therefore, we also have v ∈E′.
– If δ′ = α∧ok(nδ) :β
γ∧ap(nδ) , then α ∧ ok(nδ) ∈E′i and ¬β /∈E′.
By the induction hypothesis and the fact that E′ is deductively closed, we get
α ∈ E′. This is however equivalent to α ∈ E. Correspondingly, we have ¬β /∈ E.
This implies δ ∈ GD(D,E), that is, γ ∈ E; hence γ ∈ E′ because E ⊆ E′.
Also, ap(nδ) ∈ E′ because {ap(nδ) | δ ∈ GD(D,E)} ⊆ E′. Therefore, we obtain
α ∧ ok(nδ) ∈E′, that is, v ∈E′.
– If δ′ = ok(nδ) :¬αbl(nδ) ), then ¬α /∈ E′, whence ¬α /∈ E. Therefore, δ /∈ GD(D,E),
which implies bl(nδ) ∈E′ because {bl(nδ) | δ /∈GD(D,E)} ⊆E′. That is, v ∈E′.
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– If δ′ = ¬β∧ok(nδ) :bl(nδ) , then ¬β ∧ ok(nδ) ∈ E′i . By the induction hypothesis and the
fact that E′ is deductively closed, we get ¬β ∈ E′. This is however equivalent to
¬β ∈E. Therefore, δ /∈GD(D,E), which implies bl(nδ) ∈E′ because {bl(nδ) | δ /∈
GD(D,E)} ⊆E′. That is, v ∈E′.
Accordingly, E′i+1 ⊆ E′.
Therefore, we have shown that
⋃∞
i=0E′i ⊆E′. 2
Proof of Corollary 4.1. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.4. 2
Proof of Corollary 4.2. For <= ∅, the two conditions of Definition 4.2 are trivially true
for any enumeration of default rules. In such a case, all extension of a default theory are
<-preserving.
The actual result is then an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.4. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let (D,W,<) be a propositional, semi-normal, ordered default
theory such that (D,W) is even. Consequently (D,W) has an extension [28, Theorem 5].
Let the associated literal graph be L((D,W)) and let the associated dependency graph be
G((D,W))= (D,E).
Since (D,W) is propositional, we can simplify the translation given in Definition 4.1.
We define the translation of ordered default theory (D,W,<) over a propositional
language based on a set of atomic sentences P as follows. For each n ∈ N , corresponding
to the ground instances ok(n), ap(n), bl(n) we will have additional atomic sentences ok.n,
ap.n, bl.n respectively. For each n,m ∈N , corresponding to the ground instance n≺m we
will have additional atomic sentence n.≺.m. For sentence α of FOL, we will let Pr(α) be
the sentence where each ground instance of the form ok(n), ap(n), bl(n), n≺m is replaced
by its corresponding atomic sentence in P.
Our translation is given as follows: T ((D,W,<))= (D′,W ′) where
D′ =
{
α ∧ ok.n : β
γ ∧ ap.n ,
ok.n : ¬α
bl.n
,
¬β ∧ ok.n :
bl.n
∣∣∣∣n : α : βγ ∈D
}
,
W ′ = W ∪W≺,
and where
W≺ =
{
Pr(nδ ≺ nδ′) | (δ, δ′) ∈<
} ∪ {¬Pr(nδ ≺ nδ′) | (δ, δ′) /∈< }
∪ {ok.n>}
∪
{
Pr
(( ∧
y∈N
[
(x ≺ y)⊃ (bl(y)∨ ap(y))])⊃ ok(x)) | x ∈N}.
For δ ∈ D we denote the defaults in the image of the translation by δa , δb1 , δb2
respectively.
The translation given in Definition 4.1 is simplified by removing the default in D≺ and
instead listing explicitly the occurrences and non-occurrences of ≺ (again, represented by
|D|2 atomic sentences) about which we have complete knowledge. We no longer require
DCAN and UNAN . The last formula in W≺ in Definition 4.1 is replaced by |D| explicit
conjunctions.
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Consider the image of T ((D,W,<)), viz. (D′,W ′).
Clearly, for the respective literal graphs we have L((D,W))⊆ L((D′,W ′)).
Observe that the only addition to the literal graph comes from the final formula in W≺,
viz. the m= |D| instances of
Pr
((∧
y∈N
[
(n≺ y)⊃ (bl(y)∨ ap(y))])⊃ ok(n)) for each n ∈N.
For δi ∈D, we have the associated formula([ni.≺.n1 ⊃ (bl.n1 ∨ ap.n1)]∧
[ni.≺.n2 ⊃ (bl.n2 ∨ ap.n2)]∧
· · ·∧
[ni.≺.nm ⊃ (bl.nm ∨ ap.nm)]
)⊃ ok.ni.
This can be written in DNF as
[ni.≺.n1 ∧¬bl.n1 ∧¬ap.n1]∨
[ni.≺.n2 ∧¬bl.n2 ∧¬ap.n2]∨
· · ·∨
[ni.≺.nm ∧¬bl.nm ∧¬ap.nm] ∨ ok.ni. (A.6)
Since we have complete knowledge about our partial order on defaults, Eq. (A.6) is
logically equivalent (with respect to W≺) to
[ni.≺.ni1 ∧¬bl.ni1 ∧¬ap.ni1]∨
[ni.≺.ni2 ∧¬bl.ni2 ∧¬ap.ni2]∨
· · ·∨
[ni.≺.nij ∧¬bl.nij ∧¬ap.nij] ∨ ok.ni
where, for δi , exactly ni.≺.ni1,ni.≺.ni2, . . . ,ni.≺.nij ∈W≺.
Since ni.≺.ni1,ni.≺.ni2, . . . ,ni.≺.nij ∈W≺, this in turn is equivalent (with respect to W≺)
to
[¬bl.ni1 ∧¬ap.ni1]∨
[¬bl.ni2 ∧¬ap.ni2]∨
· · ·∨
[¬bl.nij ∧¬ap.nij] ∨ ok.ni
where, for δi , exactly ni.≺.ni1,ni.≺.ni2, . . . ,ni.≺.nij ∈W≺.
So these formulas (one for each default) are the only formulas that add edges to the
literal graph. Since these formulas are in DNF, the edges added to arrive at L((D′,W ′))
will consist of pairs of literals drawn from distinct disjuncts in these formulas.
We obtain the following edges. For default δi we obtain the following three sets of edges
in L((D′,W ′)):
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(bl.ni,¬bl.nj)
(bl.ni,¬ap.nj)
(ap.ni,¬bl.nj)
(ap.ni,¬ap.nj) for various 16 j 6 |D|, i 6= j, (A.7)
(¬ok.ni,¬bl.nj)
(¬ok.ni,¬ap.nj) for ni.≺.nj ∈W≺, (A.8)
(bl.ni,ok.nj)
(ap.ni,ok.nj) for ni.≺.nj ∈W≺ (A.9)
Consider the dependency graph G((D′,W ′))= (D′,E ′) where E ′ = E ′0 ∪ E ′1.
(1) The four edge types in the first group (A.7), contribute no edges to E ′0 or E ′1. This is
because, for any default rule with bl.ni or ap.ni in its consequent, there is no default
rule with bl.ni or ap.ni in its prerequisite or ¬bl.ni or ¬ap.ni in its justification.
(2) For the second set of edge types, group (A.8), ¬ok.ni does not occur in the
consequent of a default in D′, and so these edges do not contribute any edges to
E ′0 or E ′1.
(3) This leaves the group (A.9). ok.nj does not appear negatively in the justification or
consequent of a rule inD′, and so does not contribute to E ′1. However, for every rule
with literals bl.ni or ap.ni in its consequent, there are rules with literal ok.nj in the
antecedent, namely the image of every rule δj (in D) where δj < δi .
So what this means is that, for W ′, we have that
If (δ′, δ) ∈< then (δx, δ′y) ∈ E ′0 for x, y ∈ {a, b1, b2}. (A.10)
Moreover, as argued above, there are no other additions to E ′0 resulting from W ′ that
weren’t already present from (D,W).
For the defaults in D′, we have the following.
(1) If (δ, δ′) ∈ E0 then there is a literal x appearing positively in Conseq(δ), a literal
appearing positively in Prereq(δ′) and L∗(x, y).
But any literal in Conseq(δ) is a literal in Conseq(δa) and any literal in Prereq(δ′)
is a literal in Prereq(δ′a).
As well, a literal in Prereq(δ′) appearing positively also appears negatively in
Prereq(δ′b1).
Thus if (δ, δ′) ∈ E0 then (δa, δ′a) ∈ E ′0 and (δa, δ′b1) ∈ E ′1. (A.11)
(2) If (δ′, δ) ∈ E1, a similar argument shows that
(δ′a, δa) ∈ E ′1 and (δ′a, δb2) ∈ E ′0. (A.12)
Since there are no other cases, E ′ = E ′0 ∪ E ′1 is completely specified by (A.10)–(A.12).
Observe that if G((D,W)) is even, then the graph with vertices in D′ and edges given
in (A.11) and (A.12) is even. (That is, the subgraph with vertices {δa | δ ∈D} is isomorphic
to G((D,W)). Otherwise for δ, δ′ ∈ D the only other edges are of the form (δ′a, δb1)
(from (A.11)) and (δ′a, δb2) (from (A.12)). But the vertices δb1 , δb2 have no outgoing edges
and so cannot be part of any cycle.) We will use this observation to conclude the proof.
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Our result now follows easily: we are given that (D,W,<), a propositional, semi-
normal, ordered default theory where (D,W) is even and for the associated dependency
graphG((D,W))= (D,E), we have that(
D,E ∪ {nδ.≺.nδ′ | (δ′, δ) ∈< })
has no cycles incorporating elements of <. (That is, if C is a cycle in (D,E ∪ {nδ.≺.nδ′ |
(δ′, δ) ∈<}) then C is a cycle in (D,E).)
For the dependency graphG((D′,W ′))= (D′,E ′), let
EC =
{
(δx, δ
′
y) | x, y ∈ {a, b1, b2} and (δ′, δ) ∈< or (δ, δ′) ∈ E ′
}
.
We have that
E ′ = E ′0 ∪ E ′1 ⊆ EC.
and so (D′,E ′) is a subgraph of (D′,EC).
By assumption, in G((D,W)) the edge set E ∪ {nδ.≺.nδ′ | (δ′, δ) ∈ <}) has no cycles
incorporating elements of <.
So in EC there are no cycles incorporating elements in the image of <.
So in E ′ ⊆ EC there are no cycles incorporating elements in the image of <.
So from the above observation, the only cycles in E ′ are even. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let (D,W,<) be a normal, ordered default theory where
Pred
(
Prereq(D)
)∩ Pred(Conseq(D))= ∅ and
Pred(W) ∩ Pred(Conseq(D))= ∅.
Consider the default theory (D′,W) where D′ is defined by:
D′ =
{> : β
β
∣∣∣∣ α : ββ ∈D and W ` α
}
.
We make use of the following lemma:
Lemma A.4. Given our assumptions above, E is an extension of (D,W) iff E is an
extension of (D′,W).
Proof. Clearly it is harmless replacing the prerequisite of a default by> if the prerequisite
is implied by W .
Since Pred(Prereq(D)) ∩ Pred(Conseq(D)) = ∅, for any default δ where W 6`
Prereq(δ), we have that for extension E of (D,W), δ /∈GD(D,E).
If this were not the case, then we would have W 6` Prereq(δ) but E ` Prereq(δ) or
equivalentlyW ∪Conseq(GD(D,E)) ` Prereq(δ).
However this is impossible since W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E)) is consistent by assumption,
and we have that Pred(Prereq(δ)) ∩ Pred(Conseq(GD(D,E))) = ∅ and Pred(W) ∩
Pred(Conseq(GD(D,E)))= ∅.
Consequently δ /∈GD(D,E) and the lemma follows immediately. 2
Given Lemma A.4 we can assume without loss of generality that for δ ∈ D we have
Prereq(δ)≡>.
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Definition 4.1 simplifies considerably. We obtain
D′ =
{>∧ ok(n) : β
β ∧ ap(n) ,
ok(n) : ¬>
bl(n)
,
¬β ∧ ok(n) :
bl(n)
∣∣∣∣n : > : ββ ∈D
}
=
{
ok(n) : β
β ∧ ap(n) ,
¬β ∧ ok(n) :
bl(n)
∣∣∣∣n : > : ββ ∈D
}
.
We conclude by noting that since it is impossible to derive ¬ok(n) for any δn ∈D, so it
is impossible to derive ¬ap(n), ¬bl(n). Hence ok(n) :β∧ap(n)
β∧ap(n) has precisely the same effect
as ok(n) :β
β∧ap(n) , and
¬β∧ok(n) :bl(n)
bl(n) has precisely the same effect as
¬β∧ok(n) :
bl(n) . Consequently our
translated default theory is equivalent to a normal default theory, which is guaranteed to
have an extension. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We start by fixing the components of the different default theories:
Define T ((D,W,<))= (Dt ,Wt ),
Dt = {δa, δb1, δb2 | δ ∈D} ∪Dt≺, (A.13)
Wt = W ∪Wt≺ ∪ {DCAN,UNAN }, (A.14)
where Wt≺ and Dt≺ are defined as their unindexed counterparts W≺ and D≺, respectively,
in Definition 4.1.
Accordingly, define D((D,W ∪ {nδ ≺ nδ′ | (δ, δ′) ∈<}))= (Dd,Wd),
Dd = {δa, δb1, δb2 | δ ∈D} ∪Dd≺, (A.15)
Wd = W ∪ {nδ ≺ nδ′ | (δ, δ′) ∈<} ∪Wd≺ ∪ {DCAN,UNAN }, (A.16)
where Wd≺ and Dd≺ are defined as their unindexed counterparts W≺ and D≺, respectively,
in Definition 5.1.
(only-if part) Let E be an extension of T ((D,W,<)). Define
E′ = Th
(
Wd ∪ {ok(nδ) | δ ∈D}
∪ {Conseq(δ)∧ ap(nδ) | δa ∈GD(Dt ,E)}
∪ {bl(nδ) | δbi ∈GD(Dt ,E), i = 1,2}
∪
{
(nδ ⊀ nδ′) | : ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′)¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) ∈GD(D
t ,E)
})
.
First, we show that E ∩ L = E′ ∩ L. We distinguish three cases, while abbreviating
{Conseq(δ) | δ ∈GD(Dt ,E)} by Conseq(GD(Dt ,E)):
• Consider v ∈W .
Since W ⊆ E ∩L and W ⊆E′ ∩L, this implies v ∈E ∩L iff v ∈E′ ∩L.
• Consider v ∈ Conseq(GD(Dt ,E)).
As before, Conseq(GD(Dt ,E))⊆E∩L and Conseq(GD(Dt ,E))⊆E′ ∩L, implies
v ∈E ∩L iff v ∈E′ ∩L.
• Consider v ∈ Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(Dt ,E))).
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We have W ∪ Conseq(GD(Dt ,E)) ⊆ E ∩ L and W ∪ Conseq(GD(Dt ,E)) ⊆ E′ ∩
L. The fact that E as well as E′ are deductively closed imply furthermore that
v ∈ Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(Dt ,E)))⊆E ∩L iff v ∈ Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(Dt ,E)))⊆
E′ ∩L.
We have thus shown that for all v ∈L that
v ∈E ∩L iff v ∈E′ ∩L. (A.17)
We draw on this fact in the sequel.
Second, we show that E′ is an extension of D((D,W ∪ {nδ ≺ nδ′ | (δ, δ′) ∈<})).
For this, we first show the following three propositions:
(1) Wd ⊆E′. This is true by definition.
(2) Th(E′)=E′. This is true by definition.
(3) For any δ ∈Dd, if Prereq(δ) ∈E′ and ¬Justif (δ) /∈E′ then Conseq(δ) ∈E′.
To show this, suppose Prereq(δ) ∈E′ and ¬Justif (δ) /∈E′.
• If δ = :¬(nδ≺nδ′ ),(nδ≺nδ′ )
(nδ⊀nδ′ )
, then we have ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ E′ as well as (nδ ≺
nδ′) /∈ E′. The definition of E′ and the fact that (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ E′ imply that
(nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ Wd , that is, (δ, δ′) /∈ <. This implies that (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ Wt≺, that
is, (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ Wt . This implies by Lemma A.1 that (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ E. Hence,:¬(nδ≺nδ′ )¬(nδ≺nδ′ ) ∈ GD(D
t ,E), which finally implies (nδ ⊀ nδ′) ∈ E′ by definition
of E′.
• If δ = δa , then Prereq(δ)∧ ok(nδ) ∈ E′ and ¬Justif (δ) /∈ E′. Since E′ is
deductively closed we have Prereq(δ) ∈E′.
With (A.17), we obtain Prereq(δ) ∈ E and ¬Justif (δ) /∈ E. Since E is an
extension of T ((D,W,<)), we obtain by Theorem 4.1(1) that ok(nδ) ∈E. Since
E is deductively closed we have moreover Prereq(δ)∧ ok(nδ) ∈ E. We thus get
δa ∈GD(Dt ,E), which implies Conseq(δ)∧ ap(nδ) ∈E′ by definition of E′.
• If δ = δb1 , then ok(nδ) ∈E′ and ¬Prereq(δ) /∈E′.
With (A.17), we obtain ¬Prereq(δ) /∈ E. Since E is an extension of T ((D,W,
<)), we obtain by Theorem 4.1(1) that ok(nδ) ∈E. We thus get δb1 ∈GD(Dt ,E),
which implies bl(nδ) ∈E′ by definition of E′.
• If δ = δb2 , then ¬Justif (δ)∧ ok(nδ) ∈E′. Since E′ is deductively closed we have
¬Justif (δ) ∈E′.
With (A.17), we obtain¬Justif (δ) ∈E. SinceE is an extension of T ((D,W,<)),
we obtain by Theorem 4.1(1) that ok(nδ) ∈ E. Since E is deductively closed we
have moreover Prereq(δ)∧ ok(nδ) ∈ E. We thus get δb2 ∈ GD(Dt ,E), which
implies bl(nδ) ∈E′ by definition of E′.
We have thus shown that Conseq(δ) ∈E′.
According to Definition A.1, we get Γ (E′)⊆E′ by minimality of Γ (E′).
To show the reverse, assume that E′ 6⊆ Γ (E′). Consider v ∈E′ and assume v /∈ Γ (E′).
We distinguish the following cases.
• If v ∈Wd then v ∈ Γ (E′), since Wd ⊆ Γ (E′), a contradiction.
• If v ∈ {(nδ ⊀ nδ′) | :¬(nδ≺nδ′ )¬(nδ≺nδ′ ) ∈ GD(D
t ,E)} then (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ E. This implies by
Lemma A.1 that (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈Wt , that is, (δ, δ′) /∈<.
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By definition of E′, we thus have ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ E′ as well as (nδ ≺ nδ′) /∈ E′.
Since :¬(nδ≺nδ′ ),(nδ≺nδ′ )
(nδ⊀nδ′ )
∈Dd , we have by definition of Γ that (nδ ⊀ nδ′) ∈ Γ (E′), a
contradiction.
• We proceed by induction on the grounded enumeration 〈δi〉i∈I of GD(Dt ,E) for
v ∈ {bl(nδ) | δbi ∈GD(Dt ,E), i = 1,2}
∪ {Conseq(δ)∧ ap(nδ) | δa ∈GD(Dt ,E)}.
We show that for all δi, i ∈ I such that δi = (δ)a or δi = (δ)bj for some j = 1,2 and
some δ ∈D that either Conseq(δ)∧ ap(nδ) ∈ Γ (E′) or bl(nδ) ∈ Γ (E′).
First, we have the following lemma.
Lemma A.5. Given the induction hypothesis, we have ok(nδ) ∈ Γ (E′).
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma A.2. 2
Base. By definition, ok(n>) ∈ Γ (E′). Clearly, we have δ0 = (δ>)a , which implies that
Conseq(δ>)∧ ap(n>) ∈ Γ (E′).
Step. Consider δi . Since 〈δi〉i∈I is grounded in Wt , we obtain Wt ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . ,
δi−1}) ` Prereq(δi). Let Prereq(δi)= φ ∧ ok(nδ) For φ ∈ {Prereq(δ),>,¬Justif (δ)}
where δi = (δ)a or δi = (δ)bj for some j = 1,2 and some δ ∈ D. Then, we clearly
have W ∪ Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) ` φ and by monotonicity Wd ∪ Conseq({δ0, . . . ,
δi−1}) ` φ. By definition, Wd ⊆ Γ (E′). Furthermore, we have Conseq(δj ) ∈ Γ (E′)
for j < i by the induction hypothesis. This implies that φ ∈ Γ (E′) because Γ (E′)
is deductively closed. By Lemma A.5, we have furthermore ok(nδ) ∈ Γ (E′) which
gives us, again by appeal to Γ (E′)’s deductive closure, that φ ∧ ok(nδ) ∈ Γ (E′). As
a consequence, Prereq(δi) ∈ Γ (E′).
Since δi ∈GD(Dt ,E) for all i ∈ I , we have ¬Justif (δi) /∈E. By (A.17), this implies
¬Justif (δi) /∈E′.
By Definition A.1, we get Conseq(δi) ∈ Γ (E′). That is, either Conseq(δ)∧ ap(nδ) ∈
Γ (E′) or bl(nδ) ∈ Γ (E′).
Thus, we obtain v ∈ Γ (E′), the desired contradiction.
• For v ∈ {ok(nδ) | δ ∈ D}, we draw on what we have just shown in Lemma A.5 and
Theorem 4.2(8). This gives v ∈ Γ (E′), a contradiction.
Since both E′ and Γ (E′) are deductively closed, we get that E′ ⊆ Γ (E′).
This completes the proof showing that E′ is an extension of D((D,W ∪ {nδ ≺ nδ′ } |
(δ, δ′) ∈<})).
(if part) Let E be an extension of D((D,W ∪ {nδ ≺ nδ′ | (δ, δ′) ∈<})). Define
E′ = Th
(
Wt ∪ {ok(nδ) | δ ∈D}
∪ {Conseq(δ)∧ ap(nδ) | δa ∈GD(Dd,E)}
∪ {bl(nδ) | δbi ∈GD(Dd,E), i = 1,2}
∪
{
¬(nδ ≺ nδ′) | : ¬(nδ ≺ nδ′), (nδ ≺ nδ′)
(nδ ⊀ nδ′)
∈GD(Dd,E)
})
.
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The rest of the proof continues in analogy to that given in the only-if-part; it is therefore
omitted for brevity. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.2. The result follows from Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 4.2. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.3. 2
Proof of Theorem 7.1.
(if part) Let E be an extension of (D,W,<) according to Brewka and Eiter [5].
Without loss of generality we stipulate for every δ ∈ D that δ ∈ GD(D,E) iff
Conseq(δ) ∈E. This condition is easily enforced by substituting each default δ = α :βγ ∈D
by α :β
γ∧pδ , where pδ is a new unique atom. This facilitates the treatment of generating
defaults δ ∈ GD(D,E) that are “inactive” in some set Ei ⊆ E because their consequent
already belongs to Ei , viz. Conseq(δ) ∈Ei . We thus ensure that GD(D,E) is identical to
the set of actually applied rules in [5, Definition 4].
Since E is by definition also a regular extension of (D,W), we show next that E is
<-preserving. To this end, consider the application sequence 〈δi〉i∈I ofGD(D,E) induced
by [5, Definition 4]. We must distinguish the following two cases:
(1) Consider δi < δj . Assume i < j .
Since δi ∈GD(D,E) and δj ∈GD(D,E), we have¬Justif (δi) /∈E and¬Justif (δj )
/∈ E. By monotonicity, we get for Ei−1 ⊆ E that ¬Justif (δi) /∈ Ei−1 and
¬Justif (δj ) /∈ Ei−1. By what we assume without loss of generality we moreover
have Conseq(δi) /∈Ei−1 and Conseq(δj ) /∈Ei−1. Hence both δi and δj are active in
Ei according to [5]. Applying δi at this stage is a contradiction to δi < δj . Hence,
j < i
(2) Consider δi < δ, where δ ∈D \GD(D,E).
By [5, Proposition 2], there is a set Kδ ⊆ {δ′ ∈GD(D,E) | δ′ <′ δ} (where <′ is a
total extension of <) such that
W ∪Conseq(Kδ) |= ¬Justif (δ).
Clearly k < i for all δk ∈ Kδ . Hence, we obtain W ∪ Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) `
¬Justif (δ).
By Theorem 4.4, there is then an extension E′ of T ((D,W,<)) such that E =E′ ∩L.
(only-if part) This direction is a special case of Theorem 7.2. 2
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Let E′ be a preferred extension of T ((D,W,<)) = (D′,W ′).
Then, according to Theorem 4.4, E =E′ ∩L is a <-preserving extension of (D,W). That
is, there exists a grounded enumeration 〈δi〉i∈I of GD(D,E) such that for all i, j ∈ I and
δ ∈D \GD(D,E), we have that
(1) if δi < δj then j < i , and
(2) if δi < δ then Prereq(δ) /∈E or W ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) `¬Justif (δ).
Consider δ ∈ D with Prereq(δ) ∈ E and Conseq(δ) /∈ E. Clearly, δ ∈ D \GD(D,E).
Hence, there is some minimal k ∈ I such that W ∪ Conseq({δ0, . . . , δk}) ` ¬Justif (δ)
and δl 6< δ for l ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Now, consider a total extension <′ of <, where δ <′ δl
for l ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Given that E is a regular extension of (D,W) and that for any
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δ ∈ D with Prereq(δ) ∈ E and Conseq(δ) /∈ E there is some k ∈ I such that W ∪
Conseq({δ0, . . . , δk}) `¬Justif (δ) where δ <′ δl for l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we get according to [5,
Proposition 2] that E is a preferred extension of (D,W,< ′) according to [5]. Since, <′
is a total extension of <, E is furthermore a preferred extension of (D,W,<) according
to [5]. 2
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